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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN FINANCE AND INEQUALITY
Mehran Ebrahimian
Luke Taylor
Students of lower-income families invest much less in college education than higher-income
families. To assess the role of financing constraints and subsidy schemes in explaining this
gap, I structurally estimate a model of college choice in the presence of financing frictions.
The estimation uses novel nationally representative data on US high-school and college
students. I propose a novel identification strategy that relies on bunching at federal Stafford
loan limits and differences between in- and out-of-state tuition. I find that the college
investment gap is mainly due to fundamental factors: heterogeneity in preparedness for
college and the (perceived) value-added of college. Frictionless access to student loans would
substantially increase consumption during college but would leave the investment in college
education mainly unaffected. I show that making public colleges tuition-free would mitigate
financing constraints, but it would overall entail more than $15B deadweight loss per year
and would disproportionately benefit wealthier students. Expanding Pell grants, in contrast,
would benefit lower-income students at a much lower cost.
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CHAPTER 1
Student Loans and Social Mobility
1.1. Introduction
At $1.5 trillion, the total student loan balance is now the second-largest liability, after
mortgages, for American households.1 The rise in college tuition and the shift in federal aid
programs from grant- toward loan-based aid in the past few decades have made student loans
a necessity for most people pursuing higher education in the US.2 Naturally, lower-income
students are expected to be the main recipients of student loans, as they cannot rely on family
support to pay for college. However, in fact, students from different income backgrounds
take almost similar amounts of loans on average—many just take the maximum limit of
the federal Stafford loan program. The natural implication is that low-income students
invest less than high-income students in college education as they do not fill the lack of
family financial support with student loans. In fact, students from low-income families pay
considerably less for tuition; mostly enroll in a nearby college with lower education quality;
drop out more frequently; and are less likely to enroll in college in the first place. Why don’t
students from low-income families take out more loans in order to invest equally in college
education?
One explanation is that financing frictions make student loans an expensive source of funds
to cover college costs. Limited access to cheap funds then hinders lower-income students
from investing in college education. This explanation justifies a popular view: “as working
families take on increasing amounts of [student] debt, higher education may actually be
increasing social and economic inequality... For those [low-income] children, the idea of
getting a college education and making it into the middle class is as likely as going to the
1

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/
householdcredit/data/pdf/hhdc_2020q1.pdf, accessed May 13, 2020.
2
In the academic year 2003-04, 41% of first-year college students take student loans, for whom the average
loan amount is $5,100—35% of the average tuition. Source: Beginning Postsecondary Students survey.
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moon.” 3 To address this concern, many have called for making public colleges tuition-free.
An alternative explanation is that students from lower-income families take out fewer loans
not because of financing frictions, but because of heterogeneity in fundamental factors such
as college-related ability, preferences for higher education, and distance from high-quality
colleges. As lower-quality colleges are relatively less expensive, naturally there is less need
to take a loan.
In this paper, my goal is to identify the role of financing frictions versus fundamental factors
in explaining the equal demand for student loans and the unequal investment in college
education between low- and high-income students in the US. This analysis is important for
several reasons. First, social mobility is intrinsically valued in modern societies, and understanding sources of persistent inequality across generations is important per se. Second,
this decomposition helps us to understand the effectiveness of hotly debated policies aimed
at increasing access to college. On one hand, public grants for college students boost social
mobility and improve on social welfare if financing constraints are quantitatively determinant for those in need (Becker and Tomes, 1986). On the other hand, if college-related
ability and preferences for high-quality colleges are the main determinants of investment
in college education, then policy interventions cause socially suboptimal investment choices
and deadweight losses. Therefore, a model of investment in human capital with financing
friction is needed to evaluate higher education policies aimed at increasing access to college
for lower-income students.
I develop a dynamic IO/finance model of experimentation and investment in college education in the presence of financing frictions and imperfect competition among colleges.
Using a novel dataset and identification strategy, I economically decompose the determinants of social mobility in the context of higher education studies. I structurally estimate
the financing friction wedge for students of different backgrounds and the value of college education via imperfect student loans in dollar terms. I measure the extent to which, given the
3

Senator Bernie Sanders, Our Revolution: a future to believe in, 2016, p.343.
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college-related ability and unequal cash-in-pocket across students of different backgrounds,
external-financing constraints cause an unequal investment in college education. I use the
model to simulate three major higher education policies currently under debate: expanding
federal Stafford loan limits, expanding federal need-based grants, and making public colleges tuition-free. Structural estimation allows me to measure the welfare gain for students
of different income backgrounds, as well as the cost of policies for the federal government.
I use a novel dataset, the confidential version of Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study (BPS), which is a panel survey from the universe of first-year US college students
in 2003-04, with two follow-ups in 3 and 6 years. The unique feature of this dataset is that it
contains information on college choices as well as the financing structure of college costs. It
also includes information on students’ family backgrounds and residency, high school GPAs,
and SAT scores. This information allows me to estimate the value of college education and
the perceived cost of student loans for students of different backgrounds. BPS also provides
data on college GPA, as well as persistence and degree completion, which allows me to model
experimentation of college education under financing frictions. I supplement this dataset
with the Integrated Postsecondary Education Survey (IPEDS), which is a public database
on the universe of higher education institutions in the US. I obtain measures for education
quality at the college level, in- and out-of-state sticker prices, grants, and the location of
colleges. This dataset allows me to estimate preferences for education quality in dollar units.
In addition, I use the Education Longitudinal Survey (ELS), a representative sample of US
high-school students in 2002 with 10 years of follow-ups. I observe the demographics of
non-college-enrollees, which allows me to estimate the value of the outside option to college
enrollment across individuals of different backgrounds.
Lower-income students are less likely to enroll in college; more likely to drop out; and less
likely to enroll in a public 4-year or a private nonprofit college rather than a public 2-year
(community) college. First-year college students from the bottom income quartile families
pay on average $8,700 for tuition in 2003-04—$5,500 (39%) less than those from the top
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income quartile. Moreover, at nearly 30% likelihood, students from the bottom income
quartile drop out three times more frequently than those from the top income quartile.
To explain this gap in college investment, I estimate a lifetime model of investment in
human capital with financing friction. There are two stages in the model. In the first stage,
high-school graduates decide to enroll in a college or not. College choice takes place and the
optimal student loan is raised. College enrollees update their beliefs over their college-related
ability during college and decide to either drop out or finish the degree. In the second stage,
students enter into the adulthood stage of life and earn an education premium in the labor
market and enjoy a nonpecuniary benefit from college experiences, and repay student debt.
Students are heterogeneous in college-related ability, which I proxy for via a student’s SAT
score, high-school GPA, and parents’ education. The value-added of college education for a
student, which is comprised of both monetary returns and nonpecuniary benefits, includes
three terms. The first term depends solely on a student’s college-related ability and generates
variations in college enrollment, unconditionally, across students of different backgrounds
and attributes. The second term is college-specific, which determines the popularity and
market share of a college. Finally, the third term is the interaction between a student’s ability
and the observed quality of a college, which represents a complementary effect: relatively able
students might value high-quality college more. This term generates a stylized enrollment
pattern of able students into high-quality colleges.
Importantly, I do not assume perfect competition among colleges, in which case tuition and
fees would equal the marginal cost of providing education services. Geographical barriers
might give colleges a natural monopoly power over nearby students. I assume students
choose from a menu of colleges with a disutility assigned to distant colleges, knowing that
the education quality at the college level is not necessarily reflected in the tuition (net of
grants) charged by colleges. Basically, tuition may be the endogenous choice of a college
based on students’ demand driven by unobservable (by econometricians) education quality
and competition with other colleges, who set tuition endogenously as well.

4

Students are heterogeneous in terms of cash-in-pocket, which represents variation in family
support in the college-going ages; but they can take on debt to pay for college. The return
rate on student loans perceived by students is possibly higher than the student’s subjective
time discount rate. I call this the financing friction wedge. This wedge can be justified
by adverse selection and moral hazard frictions in the private loan market; administrative
and application fees; impact on credit history and/or nonpecuniary costs associated with
uninsurable default risk in later stages of life; debt overhang; or simply debt aversion as a
behavioral phenomenon.
The financing friction wedge adversely impacts education and social mobility. To avoid
paying extra returns on a student loan, a student needs to internally finance college costs,
which reduces consumption and hence utility in college-going ages. Therefore, assuming that
momentary utility over consumption is concave, a student with insufficient cash-in-pocket
is less willing to pay the expensive tuition of a high-quality college. This friction is crucial,
particularly for higher-ability students from lower-income backgrounds, who needed to lever
up in order to (optimally) invest more in college education. The challenge is to measure the
quantitative relevance of this distortion.
I use the simulated minimum distance method to estimate the model. I simulate the college
choice and financing structure of students and match a set of targeted simulated moments
with their data counterparts to estimate the model parameters. To identify the value for
education quality in dollar units, I measure the variation in college enrollment of students
across state borderlines with respect to in-state tuition discounts. The education quality at
the college level (observed or unobserved by econometricians) is the same for all students,
yet in-state students pay lower tuition. Controlling for distance to college, the degree to
which students sacrifice college quality to receive in-state discounts identifies the value of
college quality per tuition dollar.
To identify the financing friction wedge, I analyze the demand for federal Stafford loans,
which comprise more than 75% of total loan balances. Students usually exploit their capacity
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of subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford loans first;4 they may take private loans on top of
federal loans to cover the costs of attending an expensive college. I observe the bunching at
the Stafford loan limit and use the positive mass of students with a total loan exactly equal
to the Stafford loan program limit as the identifying moment to estimate the perceived cost
of taking a private loan. I then back out the return rate on internal financing—paying out
of pocket as the outside option to student loans, using the idea that the return rate on all
sources of funds is the same in equilibrium. This identification strategy gives me an estimate
of the value of one dollar cash in college-going time, in units of lifetime wealth.
My paper has three main results. First, financing frictions cause a nontrivial real and financial distortion. To find this result, I run a counterfactual exercise in which I set the
estimated financing friction wedges associated with student loans to zero. In such a frictionless world students would take on much more debt: student loans almost triples—increases
by about $4,500 per year on average for students from families with below-median income.
This extra loan is, however, mainly used by students to consume more during college. Students of below-median income families enroll in colleges with about only $700 higher tuition
per year. Nevertheless, this increase is nearly thirty percent of the estimated gap in tuition
payment between students of the below and above median income families. Geographical
mobility is boosted on the margin as well and lower-income students are more likely to enroll
in distant colleges. The impact on college enrollment, dropouts, and degree attainment is
more marginal, suggesting that financing constraints may affect college education mainly
through intensive margins. Overall, while it causes real distortions, financing frictions is not
the main explanatory factor of unequal investment in college. The main part of the gap in
enrollment pattern and degree attainment is due to the heterogeneous (percieved) value for
college education—the complementary effect between students’ (percieved) college-related
4

Subsidized Stafford loans have an upper limit of $2,625 in 2003-04. Individuals may receive less, based
on the college cost and their “expected family contribution”. The limit on total (subsidized and unsubsidized)
Stafford loans is $2,625 for dependent students, and $6,625 for independent, or dependent students whose
parents are not eligible for PLUS loans (due to poor credit history, for example). The interest does not
accrue on subsidized loans while a student enrolls in college. Note that limits here are reported in 2003
dollars. See more details on the limits and rates in footnotes 10 and 11.
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ability and the college quality, and the fact that there is a positive correlation between income
background and the estimated (percieved) college-related ability. This result implies that
fundamental factors—readiness for college and college orientation—are first-order determinants of investment in the college and investment disparities between rich and poor students.
Nonetheless, frictionless access to student loans would improve on students’ welfare as, given
a level of investment in college education, it raises consumption during college—improves
on consumption-smoothing over the lifecycle. I estimate the welfare loss due to frictions to
be $8.4B per cohort of students.
Second, I show that lifting federal Stafford loan maximum limits could only marginally
resolve distortions due to financing constraints. I simulate students’ responses to the increase
in Stafford loan limits implied by the Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005 and the
Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008. Although these incidents represent
a major shift in the history of higher education policies in the US, their real impact is small
overall. For low-income students (those from below median income families) the policy
overall induces a $500 (20%) increase in student debt, while increases payment for tuition
by only $70. The remainder is, again, used to increase consumption during college.
Finally, I show that making public colleges tuition-free entails social inefficiencies and has
negative redistribution consequences, and mainly benefits wealthier students; whereas expanding federal Pell grants is a much more cost-effective policy to support lower-income
students. I estimate the budget cost of making public colleges tuition-free to be nearly $60B
per year. In response to this policy, students shift from private to (distant) public colleges.
In the end, the increase in students’ surplus is nearly $43B—$17B less than what the government pays as the subsidy. The policy entails a social deadweight loss because students would
not internalize the social cost of enrolling in an (expensive) public college, where the social
value to their enrollment might be less than its social cost. Students would mainly enroll in
now-free public colleges, even though a socially optimal allocation may assign a student to a
nearby private college, simply due to geographical proximity. Although the policy would cut
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student debt by about 50% on average, the benefit from alleviating financing constraints is
considerably less than the costs associated with distorting relative prices (tuition of public
vs. private colleges). Therefore, the policy overall entails a sizable social deadweight loss of
around $17B per year.
Importantly, benefits from making public colleges tuition-free are unequally distributed
among rich and poor students. Students of families in the top income quartile would receive
nearly $15B more in government subsidy than students from the bottom income quartile. The distribution of subsidy is unequal because, per estimation results, high-quality
and expensive colleges are more valuable for students with more college-related ability, and
these students tend to come from high-income families. Therefore, even though financing
constraints would no longer be a challenge for low-income students, high-income students
would keep enrolling in relatively more expensive colleges with higher quality, would drop
out less frequently, and would be more likely to enroll in a college in the first place. This
continued disparity makes students of high-income backgrounds the main recipients of the
government subsidy.
On the other hand, I show that expanding Pell grants would be much more cost-effective
in providing access to college education for low-income students. In 2003-04, this grant
covers up to $5,500 (in 2019 dollars) of college costs, including tuition and living costs of
students from lower-income families. The effective payment is mainly determined by the
family income and is independent of the college choice. Hence, conditional on enrollment,
this grant mimics the form of a lump-sum subsidy to a low-income student and, in contrast
with making public colleges tuition-free, does not distort the allocation of students into
colleges. I show that increasing the maximum limit by 140% (up to $13,500) would deliver
the same welfare gain as making public colleges tuition-free to students of the bottom income
quartile at only one-sixth of the cost for the federal government.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. The economic model I present builds
on basic theories of investment in human capital with financing frictions (Becker and Tomes,
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1986; Ljungqvist, 1993; Mookherjee and Ray, 2003). A vast literature tries to examine
the empirical predictions for the case of higher education—whether financially constrained
individuals invest less in college education, after controlling on an individual’s ability.
See, among others, Carneiro and Heckman (2002); Belley and Lochner (2007); Lovenheim
(2011); Brown et al. (2012); Bulman et al. (2016). This literature mainly focuses on college
enrollment, unconditionally, using indirect proxies for “being financially constrained”. Results are mixed and depend on the sample period and identification technique. In my model,
students choose from a menu of colleges with different education quality and tuition. I use
micro-level data on financing structures and college choices, which enables me to directly
identify financially constrained individuals and quantify the implications of financing frictions for, not only college enrollment but also the payment for tuition and the quality of
the college a student enrolls in. As I show in the counterfactual analysis, the consequence
of financing frictions not only is less college enrollment and degree attainment but enrolling
in cheaper and lower-quality colleges. Plus, structural estimation allows me to do policy
analysis.
This paper also relates to the literature on the role of education in socioeconomic mobility. See Restuccia and Urrutia (2004); Chetty et al. (2017); Kotera and Seshadri (2017);
Zimmerman (2019). In a recent study Chetty et al. (2020) document a significant degree of
parental income segregation across colleges, even after controlling on proxies for academic
preparedness, which per se may explain a substantial portion of the persistent intergenerational income inequality in the US. I measure the extent to which financing frictions may
explain the observed stylized sorting of lower-income students into lower-tuition colleges,
after controlling on measures of college preparedness (including SAT scores and high-school
GPA). In addition, I quantify the costs and benefits of extensive higher education grant
policies proposed to address these frictions for students of lower-income backgrounds. I
show that even if the government fully subsidizes tuition in public colleges to reduce the
burden of college costs, the stylized sorting of lower-income students into lower-quality and
lower-tuition colleges prevails. Hence, by making public colleges tuition-free students of
9

higher-income families would receive much more subsidies than students of lower-income
families.
A vast literature examines the impact of government subsidies on higher education. See, for
example, Cellini and Goldin (2014); Turner (2014); Epple et al. (2017); Kargar and Mann
(2018); Lucca et al. (2018). This literature mainly focuses on monopoly power as the friction
on colleges’ side, and the concern is whether colleges raise tuition in response to federal aid
programs, so that students might not benefit much (Bennett, 1987). I rather focus on the
implications of financing frictions on students’ side and quantify the extent to which students
would switch to expensive and higher-quality colleges in response to federal aid policies. I
show that the efficiency gain of relaxing financing constraints via the policy of making public
colleges tuition-free is dominated by resultant discretionary costs.
A thriving literature in economics and finance documents the real impact of credit supply
on firms’ investment (Chodorow-Reich, 2013; Amiti and Weinstein, 2018; Greenstone et al.,
2020; Ebrahimian and Mansouri, 2021). In this paper, I examine the credit channel in the
context of student loans and investment in college education. In a model-based counterfactual analysis, I simulate the expansion of federal Stafford loan limits, implemented in
the mid-2000s. I show that while this policy induces an increase in average loan among all
low-income students by $500, it raises what students pay for tuition by $70. This sensitivity—a 14-cent increase in investment size per dollar of loan—is significant in comparison
to what the aforementioned literature estimates in different contexts in corporate finance.
In the context of college education, Sun and Yannelis (2016) document a positive relationship between college enrollment and private credit supply shock coming from banking sector
deregulation, with different timing across states, from the 1970s to 1990s. The scope of
results is limited, as the private sector is not the main source of student loans in the US. In
a recent study Black et al. (2020) identify the impact of federal loan expansions in the mid2000s by considering college students with a loan equal to the maximum federal loan limit
before the policy as the treatment group. The left-hand side variable is degree completion
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and post-college earnings. I structurally estimate the impact of expanding federal Stafford
loans on not only degree completion for college enrollees but also college enrollment and the
choice of college, conditional on enrollment. As I show in the counterfactual analysis, the
primary impact of lifting federal loan limits is enrolling in colleges with higher tuition, not
finishing the degree condition on enrolling in college. Plus, structural estimation allows me
to quantify the overall impact of financing frictions on students’ welfare.
Finally, this paper relates to an extensive literature on consequences of student debt on degree completion, and post-college labor market outcome and welfare (Chatterjee and Ionescu,
2012; Beyer et al., 2015; Fos et al., 2017; Cox, 2017; Di Maggio et al., 2019). Debt-overhang
and mispricing loans are two frictions that drive debt-aversion. In my model students have
a perception of post-college costs associated with taking on student debt. Using a revealed
preferences approach, I estimate the implication of this cost for college choice and tuition
payment. I show that debt is not neutral and the net present value of the investment in
college education is lower if it is financed via debt. This is why, if low-income students had
sufficient cash-in-pocket to internally finance college costs, the payments for tuition would
increase. I estimate the welfare implications of eliminating student debt via expanding
federal grants. The counterfactual analysis shows that expanding Pell grants could reduce
student debt and boost college enrollment for lower-income students, at a much lower cost
than making public colleges tuition-free.

1.2. Data and Facts
Data Sources. I use the confidential version of Beginning-Postsecondary-Students survey
2004-09 (BPS:04/09), which is a student-based panel survey covering the whole population of
the first-time first-year US college students in 2003-04, with two follow-ups in 2006 and 2009.
This dataset reports students’ demographics, SAT scores and high-school GPA, parents’
education and family income in 2002; the choice of college in 2003-04, state of residency and
distance to college, tuition payments, federal and private student loans, federal, state, and
institutional grants; and enrollment spells and dropouts/stopouts throughout 2009.
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I collect information on colleges from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS), which is a publicly available database provided by National Center for Education
Statistics in order to help students to choose between colleges. This database reports annual data on tuition and fees charged for in- and -out-of-state students, admission rules,
graduation rates, faculty salaries, average grants given to students, and the location of the
universe of title IV higher education institutions.
I supplement these datasets with the confidential version of Education Longitudinal Study
of 2002 (ELS:2002), which is a panel survey covering the whole population of 12th grade US
high-school students in 2003-04, with second and third follow-ups in 2006 and 2012. This
dataset helps me to obtain the population size and attributes of the potential consumers of
higher education studies. This dataset reports students’ high-school GPA and SAT score
for those who take the test, parents’ education, and family income category.
Selection Criteria. I keep dependent students in the BPS:04/09 sample who enroll for the
first time in college before or at age 21 and attend full-time at college to pursue a two-year- or
four-year academic degree (associate or bachelor’s). I drop students in vocational/technical
training programs. This leaves us with a sample of 8,720 students representing 1.7 million US
college students enrolled for the first-time in college in 2003-04, with two follow ups in 2006
and 2009.5 I keep title IV higher education institutions from IPEDS who offer at least a twoyear academic degree and drop postsecondary institutions with vocational/technical training
programs. I drop small institutions: those with less than 15 full-time faculty/employer or
those who enroll less than 50 first-year students, due to unavailable and noisy data. These
criteria leave us with around 3,000 colleges and universities in the US each enrolling on
average 600 full-time first-year students. Finally, I drop high-school dropouts and track
high-school students from ELS:2002 who have received a high-school degree before the age
5

I keep young dependent students as in this research I focus on the impact of family income background
on college education and the data is not reported for independent and old students. Students older than 21
make less than 20% of the entire population of students going to at least a two-year program institutions.
I only keep full-time students (more than 80% of the remained sample) as in the model I abstract from
working during college with part-time enrollment. Part-time enrollment besides working in the labor market
in older ages in pursuit of a one-year vocational/technical training certificate should be considered as an
outside option to college enrollment.
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of 20.6 This criterion leaves us with a sample of 11,400 observations representing 2.7 million
high-school graduates in the US who were 12th graders in 2003-2004, with eight years of
follow ups, from which roughly 60% enroll full time at a two- or four-year college to pursue
an undergraduate degree.
In what follows I report statistics on students’ attributes; enrollment patterns and college
choices; colleges’ characteristics; and finally, financing structure of college costs (student
loans, grants, and out-of-pocket expenses). In the end, I present a suggestive evidence that
shows financing constraints cause real distortions. All variables with dollar unit are reported
in 2019 dollars.
Students’ Attributes. Table 1.1 reports summary statistics on proxies of college-related
ability for students of different backgrounds. Students from low-income families are more
likely to be in a family with no college experiences; have lower SAT scores on average; and
have lower high-school GPAs. This pattern indicates an unequal preparedness for college
studies across students of different backgrounds. However, there is a significant variation
in attributes within each income background group. Standard deviation in SAT scores for
low- and high-income students are of the order of the gap in average SAT between lowand high-income students. This overlap in attributes allows me to identify the impact of
college-related ability versus cash-in-pocket on investment in the college education.
Investment in College Education. Low-income students considerably invest less in
college education. See table 1.2. In sum, 45% of high-school graduates from the bottom
income quartile families enroll in a college; pay nearly $9,000 on average for tuition and fees
conditional on enrollment per year, where about 50% of enrollees could attain a bachelor’s
degree. Students in the top income quartile, however, enroll in a college with nearly 80%
likelihood; pay around $14,000 for tuition and fees per year, where 80% could attain a
bachelor’s degree.7 Notably, this gap in investment is not just a left- or right-tail phenomenon
6

This group represents about 83% of the entire population of 10th grade students in the US. Highschool dropouts cannot enroll in a college to pursue an undergrad degree and are not considered a potential
consumer of higher education in my model.
7
BPS follows students for six years and I cannot precisely identify dropouts from stopouts in the last year
of survey study. I label a student as a college dropout if she has attained no degree from 2003 throughout
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withing an income group. The entire distribution of tuition payments shifts to the right as
family income increases. See the supplementary table A.1. Moreover, there exists substantial
variation in payment for tuition, within a specif category of low- or high-income student.
The standard deviation of tuition is around $9,000 and $12,000 for students of the bottom
and top income quartile—of the order of the gap in mean tuition across income quartiles.
I argue that there exists significant heterogeneity in college-related ability, even within a
specific income background category, which drives college enrollment, payment for tuition,
and degree attainment. Those low-income students in the right tail of college-related ability
are supposed to lever-up with student loans to pay for the expensive tuition of a high-quality
college and attain a bachelor’s degree—feature upward mobility in the society. Financing
constraints can be a barrier.
College Choice. Low-income students enroll in not just lower-tuition colleges, but also
in colleges with lower graduation rates, lower-paid faculty, and open admission policy. Table 1.3, Panel A shows that students of different backgrounds enroll into specific college types
in a stylized way. About 45% of low-income students enroll in public two-year (community)
or for-profit colleges and 55% attend public four-year or private nonprofit colleges. Whereas,
more than 80% of high-income students enroll in private nonprofit or public four-year colleges. As table 1.4 shows, faculty salaries are systematically lower in public two-year and
for-profit colleges; graduation rates are also lower and most of these colleges have an open
admission policy, which suggests that the cohort quality is relatively lower on average. The
question remains whether low-income students are less prepared for college (table 1.1) and
put relatively less value on a high-quality college, or if low-income students cannot finance
the expensive tuition of a high-quality college. Besides, many low-income students attend
a nearby college, which helps to save on housing costs by living with parents during college
studies (see the supplementary table A.2). The concern is that colleges may exert monopoly
2009, and she has left the college before 2009 for at least four academic semesters. Choosing the threshold
four semesters is based on the fact that about 80% of students with a stopout in the period 2003-2009
returned to college in less than 24 months. I assume those who are still enrolled in 2009 and have no degree
yet (mostly due to prior stopouts) would attain the degree of the program in which they are enrolled in
2009.
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power on low-income nearby students and provide lower-quality education, per unit of a
dollar charged for tuition.
Student Loans. Student loans are an important source of funds to cover tuition cost.
Table 1.5 shows statistics of total student loans for students of different income backgrounds.
Students from low-income families are slightly more likely to take a student loan. However,
the average size of loan, conditional on taking a loan, does not systematically vary across
students of different backgrounds. Federal loan limits are a determinant factor for the
demand for student loans. Around 25% of all students raise a total loan exactly equal to the
federal subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford loan limit ($3,600 and $9,085 in 2019 dollars).
This is more than 50% of students with a positive loan. Moreover, only 5-10% of all students
take private loans on top of federal loans, as Stafford loans might not satisfy their financial
needs. The bunching on the federal Stafford loan limits is an indicator of a higher return
rate on private loans loans perceived by students. A higher rate can be justified by an
uninsurable default risk for students, or moral hazard and adverse selection as frictions in
the private loan market. I will target the observed bunching in identifying the friction wedge
in the estimation section.
Grants. Public funds and school grants are also a critical source of funds to finance college
costs, especially for low-income students. Student in the bottom family income quartile
received around $5,400 in federal and state need-based grants in the academic year 2003-04.
The most important source is the federal Pell grant program. Low-income students are
qualified to use Pell grant to pay for tuition and room and board in any title IV higher
education institution in the US. In regard to institution (school) grants, students in the
top family income quartile receive a total of $3,200 in grants from colleges, with the largest
share being merit-based, as opposed to students in the bottom quartile who received $2,200
in school grants on average with the largest share being need-based. In sum, students in
the bottom income quartile received a total of $8,300 in grants from all sources, mostly
being need-based, whereas students in the top income quartile received $4,400 in grants on
average, with the largest fraction being a merit-based grant. See details in the supplementary
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table A.3.
1.2.1. Financing Constraint: Suggestive Evidence
I first show that the correlation between family income and investment in college education
holds even after controlling on measures of college-related ability: students’ SAT and highschool GPA and parents’ college education. Then I propose proxies for “being financially
constrained” and investigate whether financing frictions may impact investment in college
education.
The empirical specification that I consider resembles a classic model in corporate finance.
The investment theory in a Modigliani-Miller world implies that a firm’s investment level
is only explained by Tobin’s Q—investment opportunities. Firm liquidity, say current cash
flow, must have no explanatory power. Motivated by this idea, I consider college enrollment,
degree attainment, and payment for tuition and fees as measures of investment in college
education in the left-hand side of a regression model. Students’ SAT scores, high-school
GPA, and parents’ education are proxies for the investment opportunities, and family income
in a year before the student’s college age is a proxy for inside cash are right-hand side
variables. Regression results are reported in table 1.6.
The regression coefficient of family income is economically and statistically significant, especially after controlling on (need-based) grants. The coefficient in a univariate regression of
log(tuition) on log(f amily income) is .233. As I show in table 1.1, family income correlates
with factors that proxy college-related opportunities. After including students’ SAT score
and high-school GPA and parents’ education, the coefficient shrinks to .057, which is statistically significant at 5% p-value. I also measure the impact of family income, having controlled
on total grants. Need-based grants are a crucial source of funds for lower-income students.
This is why after controlling on grants the point estimate increases to the significant value
of .239. Logit regression models also document a positive and significant relationship between family income, and college enrollment and bachelor’s degree attainment conditional
on enrollment. A 20% increase in family income is associated with a 1 percentage point in-
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crease in college enrollment likelihood, and a 1.2 percentage point increase in the likelihood
of attaining a bachelor’s degree, conditional on enrolling in a college.
A concern is that SAT score and other proxies I include in the OLS and Logit models
above are imperfect signals on college-related opportunities; and family income not only
represents cash availability, but also contains marginal information on the college-related
ability. To address this concern, I consider having a sibling in college, before or at the same
time a student is enrolling in the college, as a proxy for available financial resources in the
family. Results are presented in table 1.7. Having a sibling in college might still correlate
with college-related ability of a student; but, if anything, the correlation is positive, since
it indicates the family environment is college oriented. Despite this source of positive bias,
the estimated regression coefficient is negative and statistically/economically significant;
dependent students with a sibling in college pay around 7% less for tuition and fees.
To identify financially constrained individuals, I also target a subgroup of students whose
total student loans is exactly equal to the federal Stafford loan limits. Given total grants and
family contribution, such students could have paid more for tuition either by taking other
types of loans, e.g., private student loans, or, say, by cutting their everyday consumption
and payment for housing. I control on the level of loan to extract the discontinuity effect
associated with being right at the Stafford loan boundaries. The OLS estimate reads students
on the Stafford loan limits pay about 8% less for tuition and fees. Subsample estimation
shows that the point estimate is larger in absolute terms for lower-income students. See the
supplementary table A.4. The regression coefficient is -.143 for students of families in the
bottom income quartile families and -.071 for students of the top income quartile. Statistical
power is limited though in the subsample regressions.

1.3. Economic Model
In this section, I present a lifetime model of investment in human capital with financing
friction. There are two stages in an adulthood life. Investment and experimentation in
higher education takes place in stage one. At the beginning of stage one, a high-school
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graduate decides to enroll in college, or to just enter the labor market, in which case she
enters the second stage of life as an unskilled worker. During college, a student updates her
belief over her college-related productivity; she then may drop out, or finish the degree and
enter the second stage of life as a skilled worker.
1.3.1. Fundamental Factors
Individuals’ Attributes. An individual, named by subscript s from the type set S, draws
a college-related ability As representing fundamental factors, such as pre-college education
quality, which affect the productivity of the individual in the college. Given an initial belief
(i)

over As , called As , the individual decides whether to enroll in college or not.
(f )

The student observes a second component of the college-related ability, named As , while
she is in college; then she decides to drop out, or finish the degree. In case she is enrolled in
a two-year college, she may finish college with an associate degree or transfer to a four-year
college in pursuit of a bachelor’s degree. Students enrolled in four-year colleges have also the
option of either drop out, quit college earlier with an associate degree, or attain a bachelor’s
degree.
I specify the college-related ability A as a scalar composed by A(i) and A(f ) in the form
(f )
As = A(i)
s + As
′
A(i)
s = Ā + Π Ds + π1 νs

(A)

)
A(f
s = π2 ρs

Here, Ā is the mean ability and Ds is a vector of observable attributes—specifically, highschool GPA, SAT score, parents’ education and income, and whether she has a sibling with
college experience. νs ∼ N (0, 1) is the unobservable (by econometricians) component of
ability; Π is a vector of coefficients with the same size as D. π1 is a scalar that controls the
contribution of the unobservable component to students’ ability.
The individual does not observe ρs ex-ante. ρs is either plus or minus one with equal
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probabilities and is realized during college studies. π2 is a constant that captures the extent
to which a student’s belief over her college opportunities updates during college. The student
perfectly observes ρs while econometricians observe a noisy signal of ρs —namely, students’
college GPA.
Colleges’ Characteristics. A student may choose a college, named by subscript u, from
the college set U. The education quality at college u is represented by the observable and
unobservable (by econometricians) components described by scalars Hu and ξu , respectively.
I specify Hu as
Hu = H̄ + ∆Hu = H̄ + Γ′ Xu

(H)

Here H̄ is the mean college quality and Xu is a vector of observable characteristics, specifically, an indicator for two- vs. four-year program colleges, open admission policy, faculty
salaries per enrollees, admission rate, and graduation rate and percentile 75th of the SAT
score of students enrolled in that college in previous years as a proxy for cohort quality. Γ
is a vector of coefficients with the same size as Xu .
Sticker Price. Tuition and fees charged by college u for student s is denoted by Tu −Isu ∆u .
Tu represents the tuition charged for out-of-state students and ∆u represents the tuition
discount for in-state students. Isu is an indicator that is equal to one if the student s is the
resident of the same state operating the public college u. ∆u is zero for private colleges.
Geographical Barriers. An individual is free to apply for any college across the nation,
except that she pays a nonpecuniary cost χdsu , where dsu represents the log-distance between
student s and college u, and χ is a fixed parameter that depends on students’ background
and colleges’ type. This cost captures students’ imperfect information on distant colleges
and the popularity of colleges for nearby residents, as well as traveling barriers and the
disutility to go far from family. This geographical cost contributes to endogenous market
segmentation across the country. It naturally creates a monopoly power for colleges on the
neighborhood students and possibly affects pricing decisions of colleges.
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The Value to Higher Education. I specify the mean value to pursue higher education
at college u for student s as

ωAs + ξs + θAs Hu + αHu + ξu − χdsu

where ξs and ξu are student and college fixed effects, and ω, θ, α and χ are fixed parameters.
The value to outside option—no college enrollment—is normalized to zero for each student
type s. This mean value scales with the type of degree: bachelor’s, associate, or dropout.
In what follows I explain how this mean value, plus the disutility to pay for college tuition,
enters into the lifetime utility-maximization problem for the college choice and the dynamic
choice of degree in the college-going age. Importunately, one should consider what is specified
above as the perceived value of college from students’ viewpoint. My estimation is based on
revealed preferences reflecting what students of different backgrounds think about the value
of college education, not necessarily the one that is realized and is objectively measured
through say labor income gains.
1.3.2. Financing College Costs
inst from college u. A student may
Grants. The student s possibly receives a grant gsu
state by enrolling in an in-state college. Besides, a
also be qualified for the state grant gsu
f ederal
student may receive grants from private sources gspriv and a federal grant gsu
which is

mostly through the Pell grant program; Pell is a need-based grant that is assigned based on
the student’s income background and the cost of attendance (COA) at a college; the main
determinant in the academic year 2003-4 is, however, the student’s income background,
as the COA at almost all colleges is above the policy threshold. The total grant gsu =
state + g inst , however, depends both on a student’s attributes and the
gspriv + gsf ederal + gsu
su
state and g inst I fit a nonparametric model using the
college she is enrolling in. To set gsu
su

observed student-level data on state and institution grants with students’ attributes and
colleges’ characteristics and their interactions as explanatory variables. I assume that the
stochastic error term in this model is realized for a student after she is enrolled in a college,
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as students have imperfect knowledge on the exact amount of grants they would receive
when choosing a college.8
Cash-in-pocket. A student is endowed with initial cash-in-pocket ms representing family financial support and job earnings during college studies. I assume m is log-normally
distributed with a mean and variance depending on families’ income levels. Low-income
families may deliver less funds to their children for college studies. All families may provide
housing to their children during college with dollar value h; students who go to a nearby
college (dsu ≤ d0 ) can live with parents during college and benefit from h on top of ms .9
Student Loans. Students may save part of the inherited endowment at the gross rate R0
for the adulthood stage of life. I denote the savings by B ≥ 0. I specify R0 = β −1 , where β
denotes time-discount factor. A student with less inherited wealth may apply for a student
loan, called L, at gross rate Rl to cover college costs. I assume Rl ≥ R0 . Rl can be strictly
greater than R0 due to a financing friction wedge. I calibrate R0 using the 10-year treasury
rate. In what follows I specify Rl in detail.
I consider a pecking-order model confirmed in the data: students first receive a federal
subsidized loan capped by the amount Lsub
su ; they then receive a federal unsubsidized loan
tot
sub
up to the limit Luns
su = Lsu − Lsu ; finally, students can increase their leverage by taking a

private loan. The limits on federal subsidized loans and total subsidized and unsubsidized
loans are determined by institutional formulas

Lsub
= min{Lsub , Tu − Isu ∆u + Nu − gsu − EF Cs }
su
tot
Ltot
su = min{L , Tu − Isu ∆u + Nu − gsu }
8

I use the distance between a student’s permanent home and enrolled college as an exogenous explanatory
variable for college choice, to assess potential selection bias in my grant fit model. The change in total grant
prediction is less than 5% after including the bias correction term.
9
I calibrate d0 to 30 miles based on the reported data on whether a student is living with her parents or
not during college and data on the distance to college from parents’ home. In the survey data, roughly 90%
of students who live with parents during college enroll in a college less than 30 miles away from home; also
75% of students who do not live with family and stay in off- or on-campus housing enroll in a college more
than 30 miles away from parents’ home.
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where Lsub and Ltot are Stafford loan program limits for subsidized, and subsidized plus
unsubsidized loans;10 Nu is non-tuition college costs —books and supplies, room and boarding—posted by each college; gsu is the total grant the student s is qualified for at the college
u; finally, EFC is the “expected family contribution” derived from tax return data and other
related information filed in the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) form,
such as number of siblings in college. A larger EFC is assigned to students of higher-income
backgrounds, so given a level of net tuition, high-income students are less likely to be eligible
for the subsidized loan. Unlike unsubsidized Stafford loans, the interest does not accrue on
a subsidized Stafford loan while the student is enrolled in the college.11
I consider a piecewise linear specification for the perceived cost of student loan, C(L)

C(L) = Rl L =




f0 + R0 L + ηs L





L ≤ Lsub
su

tot
f0 + R0 L + ηs L + ηu (L − Lsub
Lsub
su ),
su < L ≤ Lsu






tot
tot
f0 + R0 L + ηs L + ηu (L − Lsub
su ) + ηp (L − Lsu ), Lsu < L

(L)

f0 is a fixed cost associated with having a positive loan balance. It can simply capture
the cost of filing FAFSA forms; behavioral reasons associated with debt aversion; and the
negative impact on the individual’s credit score, which would affect the rates she may receive
for other financial products in the near future (credit cards, car loans, mortgages, etc). ηs < 0
as interest does not accrue while the student is enrolled in college. I calibrate ηs based on
the subsidized loan rates and students’ expected length of college study. ηu is the margin
10

In the academic year 2003-04, Lsub = $2, 625 and Ltot = $6, 625 for first-year independent students, or
dependent students whose parents are ineligible for federal PLUS loans due to poor credit history (category
1); for other first-year dependent students (category 2) the limits are Lsub = Ltot = $2, 625. Most of the
dependent students in the bottom family income quartile fall into category 1 and those in the top income
quartile fall in category 2. Limits increase in the second year of study to Lsub = $3, 500 and Ltot = $7, 500
for category 1, and to Lsub = Ltot = $3, 500 for category 2; and to Lsub = $5, 500 and Ltot = $10, 500 for
category 1 and Lsub = Ltot = $5, 500 for category 2 in the third, fourth and fifth years of study. A year of
study is considered to be 29 undergrad course credits. Note that limits here are reported in 2003 dollars.
11
The interest rate on subsidized loans originated for the academic year 2003-04 is 3.42%. Students start
repaying after college and the interest does not accrue while they are in college. The interest on unsubsidized
loans for the academic year 2003-04 is the same, but the interest accrues at the rate 2.82% during college.
The usual loan maturity is 10 years. Note that I calibrate the net return rate on savings R0 − 1 with the
10-year treasury rate, being 3.53% in annual terms, based on data in May 2003.
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between the rate on unsubsidized loan set by the federal government and the saving rate R0 .
It may also include costs associated with (behavioral) debt aversion as well as (rational) debt
overhang, which are more severe if the student raises too much debt. Finally, ηp represents
the (shadow) price of private loans relative to federal Stafford loans. ηp is positive simply due
to administration fees charged by banks, adverse selection and moral hazard frictions in the
private loan market, individuals’ exposure to uninsurable default risks, and nonpecuniary
costs associated with defaulting on a student loan.
I estimate f0 , ηu and ηp via a revealed preferences approach described in the identification
section. Justified by the theories that drive financing friction wedges, I assume that these
parameters vary with students’ income background and SAT score as the signal on ability.
1.3.3. Students’ Optimization Problem
In this section I sketch out the individual’s optimization problem. To simplify the illustration, I first present a simple choice model with no degree choice and experimentation
and examine the role of financing friction. Then I introduce information realization during
college-going age and model the choice of degree attainment.
College Choice
The individual has a log utility over consumption besides non-pecuniary benefits from higher
education studies. The individual’s lifetime utility is specified as

U = U1 + βU2 = log(c1 (s, u)) + β[log(c2 (s, u)) + v(s, u)]

where

c1 = m + h1{dsu ≤ d0 } − (Tu − Isu ∆u ) + gsu + L − B
c2 = ȳ(s) + ∆y(s, u) − Rl L + R0 B

are stage 1 and stage 2 consumption and β denotes the subjective time discount factor. Here,
y(s, u) = ȳ(s) + ∆y(s, u) is an individual’s labor income where ȳ(s) indicates the expected
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mean of the labor income of a type s individual, and v(s, u) is the nonpecuniary benefit
to college studies. Both ∆y(s, u) and v(s, u) depend on students’ attributes and colleges’
characteristics, hence are indexed by s and u.
I approximate the stage-2 utility by log-linearizing consumption around the base level ȳ(s).
The monetary and nonpecuniary benefit of college education then appear as additive separable terms.12
=1

z}|{
βU2 ≃ β log(ȳ(s)) + β[∆y(s, u))/ȳ(s) + v(s, u)] − βRl L/ȳ(s) + βR0 B/ȳ(s)

Here β[∆y(s, u))/ȳ(s) + v(s, u)] represents the present value of the return to the higher
education studies at college u for student s. ∆y and v are determined by the technology of
human capital formation and the intrinsic preferences for higher education. I specify13
logit shock

β[∆y(s, u) + v(s, u)ȳ(s)] = θAs Hu − χdsu + δs + δu +

z}|{
ζϵsu

(V)

As defined before, As = Ā + Π′ Ds + π1 νs is a student’s college-related ability and varies with
observable attributes; Hu = H̄ + Γ′ Xu is observable college characteristics; δs := ωAs + ξs
is the unconditional value that student type s assigns to college education; δu := αHu + ξu
12

Note that to perform this approximation I am not assuming that people with college studies earn almost
the same as uneducated labor force. For each individual I perform Taylor expansion over that specific
individual’s average income, which requires that the income gain to college studies, being equal to the
monetary gain on investment in higher education minus the return on financial costs needed to undertake
this investment, after controlling on an individual’s attributes, is of a small order of magnitude. See the
supporting evidence in the supplementary table A.5. This table reports the results of an OLS regression of
post-college job earnings on degree attainment and tuition and fees as a proxy for college quality, having
controlled on pre-college observed measure of ability—SAT score and parents’ income and education. The
regression coefficient of the dummy variable for bachelor’s degree, in a regression model that controls on
payment for tuition, is roughly $7,000 without any control on measured ability and family backgrounds,
and decreases to near $5,000 after controlling on measured ability and family backgrounds. Moreover, 10
thousand dollars—around one std change in net tuition (tuition minus grant) per college study year is
associated with about $1,200 boost in post-college annual income. I use the estimated income by the model
in this table to set the base income ȳ(s) perceived by each student type s in simulating her forward-looking
lifetime value-maximization problem. The mean ȳ(s) across all students is around $36,000, much larger than
variations in income associated with a change in tuition or degree attainment.
13
In the rest of the analysis, I ignore the base term β log(ȳ(s)) in the approximation of βU2 as it shows
up in all of the available choices.
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is the mean-taste for college u. The term χdsu represents the geographical barriers to
enrolling in distant colleges. ϵsu is drawn from type-I extreme value distribution and is iid
across students and colleges. ζ is a fixed parameter that controls the variance of the logit
shock and varies across students of different backgrounds. ζ determines the price-elasticity
of demand for college education.
In the next two sections I analyze the optimal financing choice, first in a benchmark frictionless world and then in the presence of external-financing frictions.
The Frictionless Case: Rl = R0 = 1/β
In this case a student can save/borrow at an interest rate equal to the subjective time
discount factor. I show that the choice of college and financing structure are separated.
If the individual chooses college u, the optimal student loan is solved from:
max ȳs log(c1 ) − L + constant.
L

s.t. c1 = L + constant.
The “constant" terms here vary with u but are independent of L. The optimal student loan
is set such that the student can perfectly smooth out her lifetime consumption
c∗1 = ȳs ⇒ L∗su = ȳs − m + psu

where, to simplify notations, I define

psu := Tu − Isu ∆u − gsu − h1{dsu ≤ d0 }

as the net effective price the student s pays for college u.
Having solved for the optimal loan level, the college choice reduces to

max
u∈U

−psu + As θHu + δu − χdsu + ζϵsu
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(1.1)

This is a standard mixed-logit demand model. Note that the initial cash-in-pocket m does
not show up in the college choice problem. In the frictionless case m just shifts the level of
student loan and leaves college choice, as well as the early consumption level, unaffected.
This result resembles the Modigliani-Miller theorem.
The Case with Financing Friction: Rl > R0 = 1/β
In case a student is endowed with sufficient cash in pocket, i.e., large ms , the optimal student
loan L = 0, and the saving is positive: B > 0. The optimization problem is just as in the
frictionless benchmark and B solves
c1 = ȳs ⇒ B = B ∗ := ms − ȳs − psu

(1.2)

This conjecture (positive saving) is confirmed if B ∗ ≥ 0 ⇔ ms − psu ≥ ȳs .
Otherwise, if ms − psu < ȳs (low initial endowment) the student sets B = 0 and may apply
for a student loan that solves
−Psu := max ȳs log(c1 ) − βRl L
L

(F)

s.t. c1 = L + ms − psu
Because βRl > 1, the optimal choice of loan is less than L∗ —the level associated with the
frictionless case (βRl = 1). Note that the optimum value Psu represents the disutility to
enroll in a college with net price psu .
The optimal level of student loan with financing friction wedges is based on a trade-off.
Taking too much debt is associated with extra external financing cost, but helps the student
to smooth her lifetime consumption pattern. It is insightful to define the marginal return
to early consumption c1 as

Rc :=

ȳs
1 ∂ ȳs log(c1 )
= R0
β
∂c1
ms − (psu − L)
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Rc can be interpreted as the marginal cost of internal financing, i.e., paying more for college
(higher psu ) by cutting on early consumption. A dollar more of student loan, however, helps
an individual to finance college, at the cost of a reduction in the future consumption by
the amount d(Rl L)/dL, keeping early consumption c1 unchanged. There is no arbitrage
between the two financial resources in the optimal financing plan. For students not on the
loan boundaries, Rl L is a smooth linear function; hence, the optimal L solves a first-order
condition that sets the marginal return rate to internal financing Rc equal to the return rate
on student loan:
Rc (L) = R0 + ηi , f or i ∈ {s, u, p}

(1.3)

where i ∈ {s, u, p} indicates the subsidized, unsubsidized, and private loan regions, i.e.,
sub
tot
tot
0 < L < Lsub
su , Lsu < L < Lsu , and Lsu < L, respectively.

For the pool of students on the subsidized or unsubsidized loan boundaries, the cost of
internal financing lies in a range that depends on the magnitude of ηs , ηu and ηp . The
global solution for the optimal loan demand achieves the best objective value associated
with internal solutions solved by equation (1.3) and the corner solutions L = 0, L = Lsub
su ,
and L = Ltot
su .
Finally, it is insightful to show the link between external financing frictions and the price
elasticity of demand for college education. In the absence of financing friction (βR1 = 1), or
in case ms is sufficiently large (ms ≥ psu + ȳs ), we have Psu = −ȳs log(ȳs ) + ȳs − ms + psu .
Recall that Psu is the solution to the optimal financing structure defined in the optimization
program (F). In this case

∂Psu
∂psu

= 1. On the other hand, if the financing friction wedge

is positive (βRl = Rl /R0 > 1, i.e., ηi , ηp , f0 is positive) and the initial money in pocket is
insufficient (ms < psu + ȳs ) then the envelope theorem and first order conditions with respect
to c1 and L results in
and

∂Psu
∂psu

=

ȳs
L̄+ms −psu

∂Psu
∂psu

= 1 + ηi /R0 > 1 for i ∈ {u, p} off the federal loan boundaries,

> 1 for L̄ ∈ {Lsub , Ltot } on the loan boundaries. Note that the price

sensitivity is increasing in psu , and decreasing in ηi , and in ms and L̄. An additional dollar
payment for tuition and fees has a trivial negative impact on the indirect utility as in any
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standard demand model with no financing friction. There exists an additional disutility to
price due to the tightening of the liquidity constraint under financing friction for individuals
with low cash-in-pocket in college-going age, which shrinks if the limit on loans is lifted and
financing friction wedges decrease.
Degree Choice
Having specified the fundamental elements and external-financing costs, I now introduce
experimentation and degree choice and specify the full optimization problem.
Four-year Program Colleges. First, consider students enrolling in a four-year college.
Students have three options: attain a bachelor’s degree, quit college with an associate degree,
or drop out earlier. I scale the value of i) college experience and no degree—dropout;
ii) associate degree; and iii) bachelor’s degree with g d , g a , and g b , respectively, with g b
being normalized to 4. Denote the time—number of years needed to be in college for each
degree level by td , ta , and tg , respectively, which I will calibrate to 2, 3, and 4 years based
on median observation in data. Importantly, I do not assume that the value to a degree
proportionally scales down with the time spent in college for that degree; this is meant to
capture nonconvexities and sheepskin effects: a year in college does not necessarily deliver
one-fourth of the value of four years in college that ends with a bachelor’s degree. Specifically,
one may expect g d ≪

td b
g .
tb

After enrolling in college, the college-related ability As is fully realized and the student faces
three degree choices delivering mean values
d
drop out : Vsu
(As ) = g d (As θHu + δs + δu ) − td χdsu
a
associate : Vsu
(As ) = g a (As θHu + δs + δu ) − ta χdsu

(D)

b
bachelor′ s : Vsu
(As ) = g b (As θHu + δs + δu ) − tb χdsu

The cost of attending college scales down with the time spent in college. As in the previous
section, I define the disutility to paying a net price psu per year of study as the solution to
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the maximization problem analyzed in the previous section. The optimal financing structure
solves
j,k
−Psu
:= max ȳs log(c) − βRl L
{L}

(F)

s.t. c = L + ms − psu
where j ∈ {d, a, b} indicates the degree choice and k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} stands for the class
level—number of years already spent in college. One should note that P depends on the
number of years already spent in college, as Stafford loan limits almost double toward the
end of a bachelor’s degree; it also depends on the total number of years in college, as interest
does not accrue on subsidized Stafford loans while the student is still enrolled in college.
I indicate these dependencies with superscripts j, k. In a frictionless benchmark, however,
c∗ = ȳs and Psu = psu + constant is independent of loan boundaries.
In sum, the total college cost in the first stage of life is derived as

j
Psu

=

j −1
tX

j,k
β k Psu
+

T
−1
X

β k Ps0 , for j ∈ {d, a, b}

(P)

k=tj

k=0

where k indexes time; tj for j ∈ {d, a, b} is the time length of a specific degree as calibrated
above; T is the length of first stage of the life, which I calibrate to T = 4; finally

Ps0 = −ȳs log(ȳs )

shows the utility from consumption for an individual that do not enroll in college, presuming
that she would earn a labor income as her base income in the second stage of life.
Having specified post-enrollment options, I now can recursively formulate the optimal college
and degree choice for the student type s:

max EA [
u∈U

j
j
max {−Psu
+ Vsu
(A) + λµjs | A(i)
s ] + ζϵsu

(U)

j∈{d,a,b}

where ζϵsu is the logit shock that is iid across students and colleges and λµjs for j ∈ {d, a, b}
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is an additive logit random shock representing exogenous factors to choose one degree option
over the others. µ is drawn from extreme value type-I distribution that is iid across students
and degree choices and λ controls the variance. A higher λ relative to π2 would imply that
the degree choice is based on exogenous reasons rather than learning the college-related
ability during college (recall the specification of the college-related ability A = A(i) + A(f )
with the update part realized in college A(f ) = π2 ρs , where ρs is plus or minus one with
equal probabilities).
Two-Year Program Colleges. Students who initially enroll in a two-year college have
the option of finishing the program with an associate degree and enter the labor market,
drop out earlier, or transfer to a four-year college. The value for dropout and associate
degree is similar to what I described above for the four-year programs, and the time spent
for each degree is calibrated to td = 1 and ta = 2 based on the median observation in the
data. As the third option: transferring to a four-year college for the last two years to attain a
bachelor’s degree, I assume the student chooses a four-year college as if she wanted to enroll
in a full four-year program from the beginning for a bachelor’s degree; the mean added value
is scaled down by a factor to be estimated as a fixed parameter.
Outside Option. Finally, the value of the outside option—not enrolling in college—for
individual s is simply
Us0 = −

T
−1
X

β j Ps0 + ζϵs0

j=0

as I normalize the mean value of a high-school degree with no further college studies to zero.

1.4. Estimation
I use the simulated minimum distance method to estimate the model. I match a set of
targeted simulated moments (vector MS ) with their data counterparts (vector MD ) to
estimate the parameters of the model (vector p). The algorithm is straightforward. I start
with an initial guess for the set of parameters p. Given p, I simulate the college choice and
financing structure for a student in the BPS sample. I then use the survey-provided weights
for each student in the sample and calculate the vector of simulated moments MS (p) by
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aggregating the simulated observable outcomes. I construct the data moments via the same
survey weights. Finally, I use the GMM efficient weight matrix to form the loss function.
Using the survey-provided information on clusters and sampling units, I obtain the variance
covariance matrix of data moments Ω = E[M′D MD ] − E[M′D ] E[MD ]. I iterate on the set
of parameters p to minimize the following loss function
p∗ = arg min (MS (p) − MD )′ Ω−1 (MS (p) − MD )
{p}

I sketch out the optimization algorithm I use to obtain p∗ in the appendix section A.1.
In the next subsections I first introduce the set of identifying moments I include to estimate
the model parameters. Then, I show the model fit: a selection of targeted and untargeted
moments and regression slopes, and their data counterpart, followed by the parameter estimates.
1.4.1. Identification
In this section I introduce the set of targeted moments to identify parameters of the model. I
first explain how I identify the fundamental parameters of the demand model: the preference
for higher education and price elasticity of demand; and then I discuss the identification of
financing friction wedges.
Taste for Higher Education. I estimate mean tastes for colleges {δu }u∈U by matching
the market shares. Given a set of fundamental parameters p, plus the set {δu }u∈U , I can
simulate the market share of each college from the first-year first-time students. Given p, I
iterate on {δu }u∈U in an inner loop using the fixed-point algorithm suggested in Berry et al.
(1995) to match simulation market shares with the data.
I incorporate the set of moments suggested in Berry et al. (2004) to identify parameters
governing the heterogeneous taste for higher education studies. I identify θ, which controls
the complementary between a student’s college-related ability and the college’s quality, Π:
the contribution of each observable attribute to a student’s college-related ability, and Γ: the
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contribution of each observable characteristic to the college quality, through the observed
covariation of matched attributes and characteristics. A higher θ implies a stylized sorting
of able students into high-quality colleges, so it creates a positive correlation between a
student’s observed attributes and the quality of the college she enrolls in. The elements of
vectors Π and Γ are set to match this covariation between each single observable component
of the vector of attributes and the vector of characteristics. The dispersion of students’
observable attributes around the mean pattern of matched attributes and characteristics
explains the extent to which unobservable attributes determine a student’s college-related
ability. Therefore, it identifies π1 , i.e., the variance of the unobservable component of the
college-related ability.
Figure 1.1 shows how this procedure works in practice. In the benchmark simulation, with
a positive estimate for θ, students with a higher SAT score on average enroll in colleges
with higher faculty salaries. Indeed, θ is set such that a linear fit to simulation results
mimics the same fit to data. A counterfactual simulation with θ = 0 would result in a flat
fit—inconsistent with data pattern, as low- and high-SAT score students would equally value
education quality. To obtain Π and Γ, the estimation toolbox matches similar covariations
observed in data as in figure 1.1 with various signals on college-related ability (high-school
GPA, perents’ education and income) on the x-axis, and various signals on education quality
(cohort quality, admission policy, program length) on the y-axis.
I normalize the value to bachelor’s degree g b = 4. Then, I identify the value to dropout
and associate degrees g d and g a by matching the share of students who drop out or attain
an associate degree. Dropout is explained either through an exogenous channel: λ as the
variance of the logit shock in the dynamic degree choice model; or, it is the endogenous
choice of a student driven by an update on her college-related ability. Dropouts should be
unrelated to the measured ability of a students, including those realized in college: college
GPA, and those that are known pre-enrolling in the college: SAT score and high-school
GPA, if the exogenous shock to a degree option λ is large. The variance of residuals in a fit
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of dropout on SAT score is then informative for λ. I use the college GPA as an “instrument”
to identify the magnitude of the variance of the shock to ability realize in the college, π2 . If
experimenting with college, i.e., the idea of going to college to learn the college-related ability
is a determinant factor (large π2 ), then the realized signal on ability during college (college
GPA) should be informative on whether a student chooses to drop out or finish the degree,
after controlling for the ex-ante signals on ability (SAT score). In summary, I identify the set
of parameters governing the degree choice (gd , ga , λ, π2 ) by including as targeted moments
i) the absolute share of students in each degree status; and ii) the covariation of dropout
with pre- and post-college-enrollment signals on students’ college-related ability.
I identify the disutility for distant colleges χ simply by matching the average distance between students’ permanent address and colleges. In my specification χ depends on colleges’
type and students’ background. Hence, I match the mean distance moment for different
student types and college categories.
So far, I explained how to identify parameters that govern the choice of college, conditional
on enrolling in a college. Lastly, I explain how to identify {δs }s∈S , i.e., the mean value for
college enrollment relative to the value of the outside option: no college studies. I match
the simulated rate of entry into higher education with data counterparts for students of
different attributes. To obtain simulated entry rates, I first back out the unconditional
enrollment probability, given a set of model parameters, for a student in the BPS sample.
Using these enrollment probabilities I obtain the mass of all potential entrants (high-school
graduate) on an attribute bin s and calculate the simulated entry rate for each student
type s ∈ S. I match these simulated entry rates with data counterparts by iterating over
{δs }s∈S in an inner loop using a fixed point algorithm similar to Berry et al. (1995). The
data on college entry from the longitudinal survey of high-school graduates (ELS) is used to
estimate the targeted entry likelihood for students of different attributes and backgrounds.
This procedure gives me an estimate for the set {δs }s∈S .
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Financial Resources. I observe the financial structure in data. I explicitly observe how
much grant is received (public financing) and how much student loan is raised (external
financing). Using the data on tuition and fees (investment size) I can back out the out-ofpocket payment (internal financing). For students in the bottom income quartile, the average
of internal financing is negative, as students receive grants not just to cover tuition and fees,
but also to cover part of the non-tuition living expenses during college—including room and
board. The mean and variance of internal financing is matched with data counterparts for
students of different income backgrounds to identify the distribution of cash-in-pocket (m).
To identify h, the dollar value of housing received by living with parents during college, I
include the following moment: the fraction of students going to a nearby college, conditional
on enrolling in a college. A nearby college is considered to be within a distance of less than
d0 . As I defined in the model section, d0 is the threshold below which I assume the students
can live with family during college. I match this moment for students of different income
backgrounds to have a flexible specification for h across students.
Price Elasticity of Demand. The price elasticity of demand for colleges is governed by
the parameter ζ. A high ζ would imply that students’ choice is based on idiosyncratic shocks
to the value of higher education in each college, and differences in tuition and fees is not a
relatively important factor to sort various options.
Identifying the price elasticity of demand is challenging as in any demand estimation model.
One can just try to identify ζ by assuming that tuition and fees charged by college u is
uncorrelated with unobservable (by econometricians) taste for that college ξu and estimate
ζ −1 so that the residual that explains the heterogeneous market shares, after taking out the
price term ζ −1 Tu and other observable characteristics, is not correlated with Tu . However,
the critique is that a favorable college (high ξu ) might also charge a higher price; in this
scenario, this identification method would underestimate the price elasticity of demand.
I do not use BLP instruments to identify the price elasticity of demand. Rather, I rely on the
impact of in-state tuition discounts on the relative likelihood of in- vs. out-of-state students
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enrolled in a college. The idea is illustrated in figure 1.2. The unobservable taste component
ξu is defined at the college level and experienced by all the students enrolling in that college.
However, there is a variation of price at the college level for different students. Community
and public colleges have on average a 50% tuition discount for in-state students. In the case
of private and non-profit colleges, there is no tuition discount; but in-state students would
still benefit from state grants.
Based on this idea, I target the following moment in the estimation: the covariation between
enrollment likelihood of in-state students and in-state tuition discount plus state grants. One
should note that the population of in-state students in a college is more that out-of-state
students, naturally due to proximity and easier transportation, and not necessarily because
of in-state tuition discount. This is why I target a moment that is based on a diff-indiff notion: the variation in enrollment of in-state relative to out-of-state students with
respect to the variation in the tuition discount across colleges. Intuitively, if students are
more price sensitive, a dollar more of in-state tuition discount is associated with a higher
enrollment likelihood of in- versus out-of-state students. I calculate this moment for different
subcategories of college types and for students of different income percentiles to identify how
price elasticity varies across different demographics. The identifying assumption I need is14
Assumption 1. There is no unobservable taste for a college put, exclusively, by in-state
students.
To show how this identification strategy works in practice, I run the following reduced form
regression on the data and benchmark simulation outcome.

log

# out-of-state enrollees
# in-state enrollees


= δstate(u) + (controls)u + proximity(out- vs. in-state Pop.)u
u

+ α0 (∆ + g state )u + α1 (∆ + g state )u 1{low-income }u
14
In precise terms, I need a milder assumption. For the identification method to work, there could be an
unobservable taste for a college, exclusively put by in-state students; but this term may not be correlated
with in-state tuition discounts.
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The unit of observation is a college. The left-hand side variable is the log odds ratio of
the out- versus in-state enrollees, and the key right-hand-side variable is the in-state tuition
discount plus average state grant ∆u + gustate . To see how the coefficient of interest varies
with income level, I interact the variable of interest with an indicator that shows whether
the average income of the county of the main campus of the college is below the median
income of all counties in the US.
One could argue that colleges that are far from state borders do not need to consider tuition
discounts to attract in-state students. And being far from state borders would naturally
reduce the number of out-of-state students due to geographic barriers. This is why I control
on proximity to populated-with-young in-state versus out-of state towns and cities. One
may also argue that there are unobservable factors that make a specific state desirable to
live in and those factors affect the decision of state legislators in setting tuition discount.
This is why I include state fixed effects to see how within state variations of in-state tuition
discount across colleges affect the odds ratio of out- vs. in-state enrollees. Finally, I include
a set of controls at the college level. This set includes observed characteristics that I use as
proxies for education quality, total number of enrollees, and indicators on whether a college
offers distance learning and weekend classes.
Regression results are presented in table 1.8. The point estimate indicates that $1,000 in
2019 dollars increase in the in-state tuition discount and state grants (roughly 15% of the
average tuition discount across colleges), decreases the ratio of out-of-state to all (both
in- and out-of-state) students in a college from the average 25% by about 1 percentage
point. Results are overall robust to various specifications. Plus, the regression coefficient
for simulated outcomes are similar to data counterparts.
Financing Friction Wedges. I focus on the bunching of students on the federal Stafford
loan limits to identify financing friction wedges. The idea is illustrated in figure 1.3. This
figure compares the optimal loan policy for students with heterogeneous ability and cashin-pocket in a frictionless world and in the case with external-financing frictions.
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In a frictionless world, students with low cash-in-pocket (m) and/or high ability (A) would
demand a larger amount of loan (denoted by L∗ ). The former group would not like to cut
on their early consumption, and the latter group would lever-up to increase the investment
size—pay more for tuition at a high-quality college. As there is no friction wedge there
would be a zero mass of students on the Stafford loan limit (denoted by L̄ in the graphs).
The following assumption is needed for this claim.15
Assumption 2. The distribution of students on the ability-cash space does not have a mass
point.
Introducing a friction wedge for taking private loans (positive ηp ), would create an inaction
region at the federal Stafford loan limit. The optimal choice of loan is denoted by Lc in
this case. Students with optimal frictionless loan demand L∗ < L̄ would continue taking
the same amount of loan Lc = L∗ , and take no private loans, as the distortion cost does
not affect their first-best choice. However, students who demand a small amount of private
loan in a frictionless world would reduce the total loan demand all the way down to the
Stafford limit—would not take a private loan. A positive mass of students are then pooled
to have a loan exactly equal to the Stafford limit Lc = L̄. Students who are far above the
margin might enter into the region of private loan, but they demand less compared to the
frictionless case.
The positive mass of individuals taking a loan exactly equal to the federal Stafford loan
limits—the thickness of red region in figure 1.3—will identify the interest margin on a loan on
top of the specified limits. More precisely, I include the fraction of students with a total loan
equal to the federal Stafford program subsidized loan limit Lsub as the identifying moment
for the friction wedge of taking federal unsubsidized loans (ηu ). The fraction of students
with a loan equal to the Stafford program limit for total (subsidized plus unsubsidized) loans
Ltot identifies the perceived cost of taking out a private loan on top of federal loans (ηp ).
15

What is actually needed for this identification strategy is a milder assumption: there should not exist a
mass of students on the state-space for whom the optimal level of loan in a frictionless world is equal to or
marginally above the Stafford loan limits $2, 625 and $6, 625 (in 2003 dollars).
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In order to see how ηu and ηp varies with income status and ability, I sort students into
categories based on parents’ income and students’ SAT scores and calculate the mass on the
Stafford loan boundaries for each subcategory.
To apply this identification strategy, there should exist a positive mass of individuals taking
a loan above the loan boundaries. Otherwise, any large enough ηu , ηp , including infinite cost,
would replicate the observed pattern. There should be also a positive mass of individuals
with observed loan below the limits, to identify financing costs from negative infinity. This
is the standard assumption needed in any empirical research with bunching identification.
These conditions hold in the data on student loans.
Unfortunately, we cannot identify the mass of individuals without a loan, but financially
constraint at the boundary of zero loan in the data. So a moment based on the same
intuition as described above cannot be used to identify the fixed cost associated with taking
any positive loan (f0 ). Nevertheless, a positive fixed cost f0 would decrease the fraction of
people who would demand a loan. It actually forces individuals with a positive, but tiny
amount of loan in a rather first-best world, to not take a loan. Plus, conditional on taking a
loan, the average amount of loan goes up. This intuition guides me to include the fraction
of students with a positive loan and the conditional average of loan among those who take
a loan to identify the fixed cost parameter f0 .
Figure 1.4 shows how this identification strategy works in practice. This figure illustrates
a one-to-one mapping between targeted moments and friction wedge parameters. I plot
the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of total student loans in the data, benchmark
estimation, and counterfactual simulations, in which financing friction wedges are set to zero.
The benchmark estimation perfectly mimics the observed bunching of students (jumps in the
CDF of total loans) at the federal Stafford loan limits. A counterfactual simulation with no
friction wedge on federal Stafford loans (ηu = 0) is, however, associated with a larger fraction
of student with a positive loan, and those with smaller amounts of loan would increase their

38

demand for loan up to the federal Stafford program limit.16 Although the CDF curve in
the region of private loans—the right tail of the distribution is unaffected and is almost
similar to the benchmark simulation. On the other hand, a counterfactual simulation with
no friction wedge on private loans (ηp = 0) is associated with no bunching on the federal
unsubsidized Stafford loan limit and, inconsistent with the data, the distribution of loans
would have a much heavier right tail.
Summary. Table 1.9 lists all targeted moments included to identify corresponding real
and financial parameters.
1.4.2. Model Fit
Targeted Moments. Table 1.10 reports a selected set of targeted simulated moments
and data counterparts. Simulated moments fairly mimic the data pattern of college enrollment, payment for tuition and fees and bachelor’s degree/dropout likelihood conditional on
enrollment, proximity to college, and faculty salaries at the college that a student enrolls in,
across students of different income backgrounds. As in the data, low-income students, relatively, are less likely to enroll in a college, pay less for tuition, and drop out more frequently
conditional on enrollment, and mostly attend a nearby college. Faculty salaries in colleges
that lower-income students attend are lower than the average level.
Simulation outcomes also match the pattern of financing structure observed in the data. A
larger fraction of lower-income students place a positive demand for student loan, but the
average amount of loan, conditional on receiving a loan, is similar for students of different
backgrounds. Positive financing friction wedges in the estimated model generate bunching
on the federal Stafford loan limits. As in the data, in the simulated financial structures,
roughly a quarter of students take a total loan just equal to the Stafford loan program limits,
and many do not take any private loan.
Untargeted Moments. The last tab of table 1.6 shows the results of the simulated regressions of college enrollment, bachelor degree attainment, and payment for tuition and fees
16

Note that depending on PLUS loan eligibility for parents the maximum program limits on Stafford loans
is either $3,600 or $9,085 in 2019 dollars. See details in footnote 10.
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versus family background. Simulated regression slopes are almost within the 95% confidence
interval of data estimates. The last tab of table 1.7 reports the simulated regression coefficients in the model of tuition vs. family background for financially constrained students.
As in the data estimates, students with a total student loan equal to federal Stafford loan
limits pay less, relatively, for tuition and fees.
Table 1.3, panel B, shows simulation results for the college types that students of different
backgrounds enroll in. Simulation results capture the key pattern in the data: relative to students of high-income families, low-income students are more likely to enroll in a community
(public two-year) or a for-profit college, rather than a public four-year or a nonprofit private college. Per estimation results, high-income students represent a higher college-related
ability (A) on average; also, public four-year and private colleges feature a higher education
quality (H), relative to community colleges; the complementary term in the specification of
utility for college education (θAH) with an appropriate estimate of the parameter θ then
generates an enrollment pattern in the simulation model similar to the data.
1.4.3. Parameter Estimates
Students’ College-Related Ability. Table 1.11 reports the variation of the estimated
college-related ability As across students of different backgrounds. See specification (A).
As includes terms that are known by students pre-enrolling in a college, named college
orientation and preparedness: Ā + Π′ Ds + π1 νs , from which Ds is a vector of observable
attributes and νs is an unobservable normal iid, plus a term that is realized during the
college for the student: π2 ρs , where ρs is iid and equals to plus or minus one with equal
probabilities. Π is a vector parameter, and π1 and π2 are scalar parameters. Panel A reports
the contribution of each term to the variance of As across population. About thirty percent
of the variation of As in the population is driven by the observable college preparedness
Π′ Ds ; this is because of a sizable estimate of the vector parameter Π and in the variation in
the vector of observable attributes Ds across the population. Panel B shows that the gap
in the mean observable college preparedness between students of the top and the bottom
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income quartile is roughly one in unit of the standard deviation in the whole population.
This gap exists because of a positive estimate of Π and the fact that components of Ds ,
namely SAT score, high-school GPA, and parents’ college experience, positively correlate
with income background (see table 1.1). Meanwhile, there exists significant variation in Π′ Ds
within income groups. Panel C shows that a student’s SAT score is the most marginally
informative component of the vector of attributes Ds to explaining the variations in the
college preparedness Π′ Ds . Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the realized shocks during
college for students explain nearly twenty percent of the overall variations in the collegerelated ability (see Panel A, last column).
Colleges’ Education Quality. Table 1.12 reports the variation of the estimated observable education quality Hu = Γ′ Xu across community, for-profit, public four-year, and private
nonprofit colleges. Panel A shows that the gap in education quality between community and
public colleges or private nonprofit colleges is significant—about two in unit of the standard
deviation across all colleges; while there is minor variation in education quality within community colleges. This gap exists due to a sizable estimate of the vector parameter Γ and
the variation in observable characteristics Xu across college types (see table 1.4). Panel B
shows the marginal informativeness of each component of the vector of observable characteristics Xu for the variations in Hu . The cohort quality—namely, the graduation rate and the
percentile 75th of the SAT of enrollees in a college in recent years—is the most informative
signal.
College Choice. The parameter estimate θ is positive and statistically significant with
a t-stat 19.4 for the average college. To illustrate the economic significance of a positive
estimate θ, table 1.3, Panel C reports the enrollment pattern in a counterfactual experiment
with θ = 0. Relative to the benchmark estimates, in a world with θ = 0 students of lowerincome backgrounds are less likely to enroll in community or for-profit colleges and more
likely to enroll in public four-year or nonprofit colleges. Indeed enrollment patterns would
be similar across low- and high-income students in the world with θ = 0. The term θAH in
the specification of the taste for college education with a positive estimate for θ, together
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with an estimate of A that positively correlates with income and an estimate of H that is
larger on average for public four-year and private nonprofit colleges generates the stylized
sorting of students to colleges in the model as it is observed in the data.
Degree Choice. The dropout choice is determined by three elements. First, learning the
college-related ability, which is controlled by the variance of the shock to ability realized in
college ρ; see specification (A). Second, exogenous factors controlled by the variance to the
logit shock to a degree choice λ; see specification (D). Third, intrinsic value to a choice of
dropout, say the value to get some college experience, controlled by the scaling parameter
g d ; see specification (D). Table 1.13 presents the estimated contribution of each factor to
the degree choice and also to the decision to enroll in college.
In the absence of the shock to ability (ρ = 0) the dropout ratio for students of the bottom
income quartile falls by a margin of one percentage point. The joint impact of no shock to
ability and no exogenous shock to a degree outcome (ρ = 0, λ = 0) would have a strong
effect; dropout likelihoods considerably fall to nearly zero. However, in either cases college
enrollment falls as well. See Panel B. Students in the bottom income quartile, specifically,
enroll in college by 10 percentage points less likelihood in the absence of any shock realization
during college (ρ = 0, λ = 0). The chance to draw a positive shock post enrolling in a college
creates an option value and encourages lower-income students to try college, where the
outcome is not necessarily attaining a college degree. See Panels C and D. While dropouts,
conditional on enrolling in a college, rises in the presence of shocks, college enrollment rises
as well; hence, in the end, the unconditional likelihood to attain an associate or a bachelor’s
degree among high-school graduates only marginally changes because of the shocks realized
post enrolling in college. In any case, almost the same gap in degree attainment between lowand high-income students would exist, as in the benchmark estimation. The intrinsic value
to a dropout outcome (g d > 0) also significantly impacts dropout ratio. In a counterfactual
exercise with g d = 0 the dropout ratio overall falls by around 15 percentage points. College
enrollment falls as well by about 5 percentage points. And the changes are more or less
the same across students of different income groups. On the other hand, students are more
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likely to get an associate or a bachelor’s degree. Nevertheless, more degree attainment and
less dropouts are not beneficial for students here, as students are losing an intrinsic value
assigned to a choice option—to drop out, viewed positively as some college experiences.
Financing Friction Wedges. Tables 1.14 and 1.15 report the perceived cost of taking
student loans, determined by f0 , ηu and ηp (see specification L). Standard errors are relatively
small, confirming that model parameters are locally identified. Table 1.14 shows average
return rate on loans for students of different backgrounds. High-income students pay higher
rates because they are less likely to be qualified for a subsidized Stafford loan and need
take a larger portion of their loans through the unsubsidized federal Stafford program or
private loans market. Table 1.15 shows the perceived bet return rates on one additional
dollar of federal and private loans. As calibrated by policy formula, for the academic year
2003-04 the rate on subsidized loans is about 1.9% per annum. Unsubsidized and private
loans are perceived to have interest rates of around 4.4% and 11.6%, respectively. The
perceived net return rate estimates are significantly above the calibrated benchmark rate
(R0 − 1 = 1/β − 1 = 3.53%), which highlights a sizable financing friction wedge for the
median student.
The friction wedge increases with students’ income background and measured ability (SAT
score), per estimation results; see the second and third columns. Relative to the median
level, however, the variation of return rates with income and SAT is not large in magnitude.
One should note that return rates estimated and reported here are not what is offered by a
bank in in the real world to a low- or high-income student. Even in a frictionless benchmark
a high-income or high-ability student may receive loan offers with lower rates from a bank,
because she is less likely to default on the loan as well; hence, the student anticipates to
repay the same amount on expectation anyway. What matters in determining the perceived
cost of a loan and implying a positive wedge over the (risk-adjusted) return rate for a low- or
high-income student is, e.g., uninsurable risks, nonpecuniary costs of defaulting on a loan, or
debt-aversion in general—all not priced by a bank.17 Higher income students especially are
17

Note that the student in my model is risk-neutral with respect to period-2 outcomes and there is no
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not qualified for subsidized loans and need to take out a larger proportion of debt through
unsubsidized federal or private loans, which can drive debt-aversion and a positive wedge on
return rates to a higher extent. One can also imagine that banks do not entirely factor in the
observable attributes like SAT score in pricing a loan, especially in the period of my data in
early 2000s. Therefore, as a result of a pooling equilibrium with asymmetric information and
strategic default students with higher test scores effectively pay more relatively in returns
on private student loans.

1.5. Counterfactual Analysis
1.5.1. Student Loans and Social Mobility
What if there are were external financing frictions? Through the lens of the model, this
counterfactual scenario relates to the case with all financing friction wedges, f0 , ηu , and
ηp set to zero. Table 1.16, third column, shows results of this counterfactual analysis for
lower-income students (whose parents’ income is below median). The benchmark estimation
results for both lower- and higher-income students (whose parents’ income is below and
above median) are reported in the first and fourth columns as points of comparison. In
this counterfactual exercise I keep all other model parameters and institutional features, as
well as students’ attributes, colleges’ characteristics, and tuition charges by college (sticker
prices) unchanged.18
Financing constraints have a substantial impact on the financing structure of college costs.
Students would have taken out much more debt in the frictionless scenario. The average
student loan increases by nearly 190%—$4,440 per year of college studies. The change is
mostly through the intensive margin: those who already have taken a loan would substantially increase their demand for a loan. More student loans help individuals to increase
payment for tuition—attend better colleges, or consume more during college and cutting
default in the model; the return rate R represents a for-sure repayment of loans from a student’s perspective.
18
A change in tuition payment for a low- or high-income group of students reported in this section represents a switch in college choices from less to more pricey colleges, or vice versa, for that given group of
students; not an increase in tuition that colleges charge for that same group of students. In my counterfactual and policy analysis in this section I keep tuitions charged by each college at the fixed pre-policy levels.
See discussion on the robustness of results in section 1.6.3.
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on out-of-pocket expenses for college leaving the college choice unchanged. In the latter
case, we might observe only a substitution in the financing structure of college costs under
no-friction counterfactual, not a real impact on the investment in college education. This is
mainly the case per the counterfactual results I discuss below.
Financing constraints have distortionary effects on investment in college education, but only
on the margin. By eliminating financing friction wedges, lower-income students would enroll
in colleges with $670 more tuition per year. This increase is roughly thirty percent of the
estimated gap in tuition between lower- and higher-income students. Geographic mobility
is boosted as well. Being able to finance living costs, lower-income students are more likely
to enroll in a non-nearby college; the odds of enrolling in a college—more than 30 miles
away from parents’ home increases by 3.5 percentage points—a fifth of the gap in distant
college enrollments between lower- and higher-income students. The impact on college enrollment is, however, less significant. Enrollment likelihood increases by about 2 percentage
points—one-tenth of the gap between lower- and higher-income students. Financing constraints bind for cash-poor and able individuals—for whom “no college studies” is not a
relevant option. Besides, college enrollment unconditionally–enrolling in any possible college–is not an expensive investment, as the least pricey colleges charge only a few hundred
dollars for tuition. Therefore, the impact of financing constraints on investment in college
education resonates more in the intensive margins: those who go to college would switch
to more expensive colleges. Interestingly, bachelor degree attainment condition on enrollment decreases; lower-income students would like to experiment college, so dropout rate
in the absence of frictions increases. Overall, bachelor degree attainment per high school
graduates, i.e., college enrollment likelihood times bachelor degree attainment condition on
enrollment, increases from the base level 32.6% by less than one percentage point to 33.4%
for those lower-income students in the frictionless scenario; this ratio is estimated at 57.6%
for higher-income students in the status quo.
Overall, although frictionless access to student loans would boost investment in college ed-

45

ucation for lower-income students, the impact is not sizable relative to the original gap
between rich and poor students. The difference in educational attainment is mostly driven
by fundamental factors—heterogeneity in college preparedness and value-added of college
education. Results suggest that condition on college preparedness, the technology of human
capital formation with respect to college education is highly “concave”—the gap in value between first- and second-best choices is substantial so that in response to a change in the cost
of capital (here the wedge on student loans rate) the scale of investment remains unchanged
and the financing structure—whether to pay out-of-pocket or via external financing (here
student loans) substantially varies. Financing frictions are still welfare-relevant though, as
by removing financing frictions students would demand much more loans to cut on internal
financing and consume more during college-going ages—improve on consumption smoothing
over the lifecycle. I estimate the total welfare loss due to financing friction at $8.4B per cohort of students—nearly $5,000 per college enrollee, and $3,000 per high-school graduate in
the US. As a reference, note that the total tuition payments (gross of federal, state, school,
and private source grants) per cohort of students is estimated at around $100B in the year of
my data. The welfare loss due to frictions is sizable both in absolute terms and also relative
to the overall market size.
A policy that could possibly mimic the frictionless scenario is expanding federal Stafford
loan limits. Enacted by the Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005 and the Ensuring
Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008, subsidized and unsubsidized loan limits
are lifted by about 50%.19 Although these incidences represent a large shift in the history
of higher education policy in the US, I show they could barely mitigate the financial and
real distortions caused by financing frictions. I simulate students’ responses to the exact
change in Stafford loan limits. I keep all other institutional parameters, as well as students’
attributes, colleges’ characteristics, and sticker prices unchanged. Table 1.16, second column,
19

For dependent first-year students whose parents are eligible for a PLUS loan (group I) the limit on both
subsidized and unsubsidized loans is $2,625 in 2003-04; for dependent first-year students whose parents are
not eligible for a PLUS loan (group II) the limit on subsidized loans is $2,625 and on unsubsidized loans is
$6,625. In 2008-09 the limit on subsidized and unsubsidized loans is lifted to $3,500 and $5,500 for group I,
and to $3,500 and $9,500 for group II, receptively. Note that limits here are reported in current dollars.
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shows counterfactual results for lower-income students. The counterfactual analysis predicts
that students would take $500 (20%) more debt—still much less than in the frictionless
benchmark. Moreover, many students raise their total loans to the new Stafford loan limits
and so a significant mass of students would be constrained by new loan limits—a phenomenon
confirmed by the recent release of BPS data for on college enrollees in the post-policy era.20
The real impact is relatively small as well: payments for tuition go up by $70—only 10
percent of the increase that one expects in a frictionless scenario. Per estimation results,
students ideally would like to take on much more debt to consume more during college,
but in reality perceive a high cost of taking private loans on top of federal loans. Lifting
the federal loan limits to the extent experienced in the late 2000s cannot entirely eliminate
the sizable need for (private) loans and does not speak to the “debt-aversion” problem with
respect to private loans that shows up as the financing friction wedge in my model.
In the end, it is worth measuring the sensitivity of investment in college education in dollar
units with respect to the supply of student loans. On the margin, 1 dollar more of student
loans has been associated with 14 cents more payments for college tuition, for an average
student from below median-income families in the US. This sensitivity is comparable with
estimates of the credit supply impact on investment in other contexts in corporate finance.
Amiti and Weinstein (2018), for example, find that one std bank loan supply shock is associated with a 7 percent change in the investment ratio of Japanese firms that are heavily
dependent on bank loans. Greenstone et al. (2020) use small business loan data from CRAeligible banks and show that the impact of credit supply on employment in the US overall is
not economically significant. Ebrahimian and Mansouri (2021) show that credit supply matters for employment of newborn firms in lower-income counties—$100 small business loans
is associated with about $5 increase in payroll. My estimate then highlights the impact of
credit supply on investment in human capital in the household finance context.
20

According to the latest release of BPS based on the first-time first-year college enrollees in 2011-12,
the bunching on the federal loan limits, i.e., the mass of students with a total loan being equal to the
maximum federal subsidized or subsidized loan limits, is 24.1%—pretty close to the estimate 24.7% in my
counterfactual results reported in table 1.16, column 2.
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1.5.2. Tuition-free Public Colleges
In this section I evaluate extensive grant policies that aim to reduces student debt. Table 1.17
shows the impact of making public colleges tuition-free on students of different income
backgrounds. In this counterfactual experiment, the tuition charged by public college is
paid for by the government. I leave all institutional and fundamental parameters, as well as
students’ attributes and colleges’ characteristics and tuition unchanged.
The policy increases college enrollment overall by only 2.6 percentage points and for students
in the bottom income quartile by 3.4 percentage points. The key point is that the least pricey
option in the status-quo is only a few hundred dollars, provided by many community colleges.
Therefore, making public colleges tuition free does not systematically change the choice set
of students on the margin—for whom college vs. no college is a relevant choice. The
(unconditional) degree attainment increases by 2 percentage points—not all students who
enroll at the margin could attain a degree. Indeed lower-income students would drop out at a
higher rate as the policy induces experimenting with college for marginal students.Moreover,
(pre-policy) tuition of colleges that students attend only marginally changes. There are two
competing forces; on one hand, students would switch to more expensive public colleges,
since they don’t bear the cost. On the other hand, the policy induces a substantial shift
from private colleges to now-free public colleges (compare the third row in Panels A and B),
and public colleges in general charge less for tuition than private colleges. The search for a
now-free public college increases geographic mobility; students are less likely to enroll in a
nearby college. Meanwhile, the policy significantly reduces student debt, especially among
higher-income students. This is simply because grants substitutes for loans in the financing
structure of college costs.
Notably, the main recipients of the government subsidy on tuition in public college are
higher-income students. Students in the top income quartile receive a tuition subsidy of
nearly $22B, while those in the bottom quartile receive around $7B. The reason is that
students from higher-income backgrounds, relatively, are more likely to enroll in college,
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stay more in college (drop out less frequently), and enroll in higher-quality and expensive
colleges. Although making public colleges tuition-free alleviates financing constraints for
low-income students, the heterogeneity in college-related ability and preferences for higherquality colleges (fundamental factors) would maintain the unequal pattern of investment in
college education across rich and poor students. Hence, higher-income students would be
the main recipients of the subsidy, which makes making public colleges tuition-free indeed
a regressive policy.
Moreover, making public colleges tuition-free would entail a substantial “social deadweight
loss”. While the government needs to pay nearly $59.5B in total per cohort for the program,
students’ well-being in dollar unit increases by $42.9B. Making public colleges tuition-free
distorts relative prices (tuition of public vs. private colleges) in the market for higher
education and, therefore, results in a socially inefficient allocation of students to colleges.
Students switch from a private to a relatively distant public college to save on tuition cost,
even though a private college is a better fit, simply due to proximity. In the end, however, the
government needs to incur the cost of tuition at the public college. Therefore, in sum, social
gain is negative, and per estimation results, it is quantitatively substantial. One should
note that the policy considerably reduces student debt, and by doing so alleviates externalfinancing friction costs incurred by students. Indeed my counterfactual analysis shows that
welfare loss due to financing frictions in a new regime of tuition-free public colleges would be
$3.5B—nearly $5B less than what loss due to frictions is in the pre-policy regime. However,
the efficiency loss due to misallocation of students across college types is dominant so that
the policy overall entails $16.6B social deadweight loss per year.21
As an alternative policy to promoting educational mobility, I analyze the impact of expanding Pell grants—a federal need-based grant provided to students of low-income backgrounds.
The maximum Pell grant amount is about $5,500 (in 2019 dollars) in the academic year 200321

I ignore the change in colleges’ profit in measuring the social deadweight loss, as it is less of a concern
for policymakers and the public. Indeed private colleges would significantly lose their market shares upon
the policy, so one expects a significant drop in profits on the supply side of the market.
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04; it falls to zero if a student’s “Expected Family Contribution” rises;22 or the total cost
of attendance—tuition plus living cost during college—falls. The second criteria does not
bind in 2003-04; hence, conditional on enrolling in any college, the grant takes the form
of a lump-sum subsidy to lower-income students and, in contrast to making public colleges
tuition-free, does not distort relative prices for students. I run the counterfactual analysis
of increasing the Pell grant maximum amount by 140% to around $13,500 per year, leaving
the grant eligibility, as well as other institutional and fundamental parameters, students’
attributes, and colleges’ characteristics and tuition unchanged. This grant expansion would
imply the same increase in surplus for low-income students (the bottom income quartile) as
making public colleges tuition-free.23
Table 1.18 reports students’ response to the policy. The policy boosts college enrollment
by around 5.3 percentage points among bottom income quartile students and, as in making
public colleges tuition-free, substantially reduces student debt for those students. Importantly, the policy generates less deadweight loss in comparison to making public colleges
tuition-free. Therefore, for the same benefit to students the government needs to pay less.
Moreover, by construction, expanding Pell grants only benefits low-income students and, in
contrast to making public colleges tuition-free, the government does not need to subsidize
higher education studies of rich students. In total, the program would cost $9.9B. I conclude
that expanding Pell grants is much more efficient to support college education for those in
need. The same benefit to low-income students as making public college tuition-free could
be achieved at only one sixth of the cost for the federal government.
22

Expected Family Contribution is a term calculated from family tax return and data provided in the Free
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) form and is mainly driven from family income and wealth.
23
My analysis of tuition-free public colleges in terms of social surplus ignores externalities regarding college
enrollment for lower-income students. Also, what is ignored in the welfare calculations is an endogenous
change in college-preparedness for students in lower-income families before college-going time, in anticipation
of easier access to college. By design, the alternative Pell grant policy would induce the same benefit for lowerincome students, and as counterfactual results show the same (or even more) increase in college enrollment
likelihood. Therefore, one can expect that the alternative policy brings in the same social externalities and
induces similar endogenous changes in college preparedness as well. Hence, one can safely rank policies just
based on the costs they have for the federal government.
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1.6. Discussion and Robustness
Key results are robust to several model and empirical modifications. The robustness tests I
do include dropping selective colleges and students on the right tail of SAT score from the
sample to address concerns of ignoring admission strategy on colleges’ side in the model;
modeling an endogenous change in tuition and fees by private colleges upon expanding
subsidies in forms of tuition-free public colleges or federal need-based grants, unconditional
on college type; and considering a nonzero structural correlation between the unobservable
shock to money in pocket and the unobservable component of college-related ability in the
estimation. Lastly, I discuss the assumption of the model on the impact of consuming
more during college (via taking more loans, in my setup) on the ability and performance
of students during college. Details and discussion on each robustness analysis come in the
following sections.
Key counterfactual results are reported in table 1.19. For comparison, I report the benchmark results in column one. The first set of rows shows the counterfactual results for
the increase in college investment for lower-income students (scaled by the investment gap
between low- and high-income students), and the change in student loans in the absence
of financing frictions, and the total welfare loss due to financing frictions in dollar units.
Investment may change through three margins: enrollment in a college unconditionally, enrolling in a high-quality college proxied by the college tuition and fees condition on college
enrollment, and finally, the number of years staying in that college to achieve a degree. I
define investment in college education as the product of enrollment likelihood, time spent
per college, and payment for tuition per year. The second set of rows reports total spending
by the government to make public colleges tuition-free, the ratio of subsidy received by topto bottom-income quartile students, and students’ surplus—the change in students’ welfare
in dollar units. Finally, the last row reports the total government spending on expanding
direct federal need-based grants—the federal Pell grants, which achieves the same welfare
gain as in making public colleges tuition-free for students of the bottom income quartile.
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1.6.1. Colleges’ Admission Policy
I do not model colleges’ admission process in this paper. The lower enrollment likelihood of
low test score students in selective colleges is naively captured via students’ preferences in
the equation (V). Through the lens of the model, a low SAT score student does not like to
enroll in a selective college (given the positive point estimate for the interaction coefficient θ)
in a framework that colleges do not put admission restrictions; whereas in reality all students
ideally like to enroll in selective colleges, but the odds of getting admission is not high for
a student with low test scores. One can justify this simplification if the object of interest
is to study the eventual enrollment pattern under financing constraints, not to study the
separate margins of sending applications vs. getting admission, conditional on sending an
application. Although, there is no structural assumption in general that can guarantee the
two interpretations are equivalent in terms of observable enrollment patterns. Except one
in which from a student’s perspective, the expected value of the set of colleges (taking into
account the admission likelihood) net of application fees is such that a student effectively
considers colleges with close to one admission likelihood. Those colleges are then identified
in the model as the only relevant choices in approximation due to the interaction term in
preferences. This seems to be the case for the majority of students in the data, but not for
all.24 On the colleges’ side one needs to also assume that admission is perfectly elastic: a
college cares only about the observable measures of quality of enrollees and there is no limit
on enrollment capacity—an assumption that may not hold especially in the short-run. One
can say that colleges endogenously change admission strategy upon counterfactual policies,
which would translate to a different post-policy parameter θ in the broader interpretation
of the preferences in the model; given a fixed θ in my counterfactual analysis, the scope of
24

I observe the college choice list for roughly two-thirds of students—those who apply for federal aid. In the
Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) students list all potential colleges that they might enroll
in. For more than fifty percent of students in the subset with FAFSA record only one college is indicated in
the choice list; plus, about three-quarters of students end up enrolling in their first-ranked college, even if
more than one college is indicated in the application form. Note that this subset of students with a FAFSA
record is fairly representative of both low- and high-income students; lower-income students send FAFSA
to receive federal and state need-based grants and higher-income students send FAFSA in order to receive
federal student loans.
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results are then limited as a “partial” equilibrium analysis.
As a robustness check, I re-estimate the model for a subsample of colleges that are not
selective, and the subsample of students that do not have a relatively high test score—for
whom the admission process and enrolling in selective colleges is less relevant. Specifically,
I drop the top 100 universities and top 100 liberal art colleges based on the 2021 US news
ranking, and I drop college students and high-school graduates that end up enrolling in those
top colleges and/or have an SAT score above the 90th percentile in the sample of college
enrollees. These criteria drop the population of college enrollees from 1.7 to 1.2 million and
of high school graduates from 2.7 to 2.1 million. The model is re-estimated to match the
targeted data moments in the subsample and then counterfactual analyses are done via the
model with re-estimated parameters in the subsample of students and colleges.
Counterfactual results are shown in table 1.19, column two, and are compared to the benchmark full-sample results in column one. In order to get comparable numbers with the
full-sample benchmark estimates, I re-scale aggregate numbers in dollar units for student
surplus and government subsidy with the population of students in the subsample relative
to the population in the full sample. Overall, similar results are achieved in the subsample
estimation of non-selective colleges and students. Welfare gains overall upon eliminating
financing frictions is lower than the benchmark as one can expect financing constraint binds
especially for students who consider high-quality selective colleges, which tend to be more
expensive colleges. The government’s spending for making public colleges tuition-free is
estimated to be lower, as top colleges tend to charge higher tuition. Yet there is significant
deadweight loss: students’ well-being increases by $14B less than what government spends
for making public colleges tuition-free and the subsidy to higher-income students are significantly more relative to lower-income students. As in the benchmark case, expanding the
federal Pell grant is a much more efficient alternative in supporting lower-income students.
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1.6.2. Correlated Shocks to Ability and Wealth
In the benchmark estimation, I assume a zero correlation between shock to initial cashin-pocket in the mode: ms described in section 1.3.2, and the unobservable component of
the college-related ability: νs in equation (A). One can think of a positive correlation, e.g.,
because able students may expect to receive more financial support from their families or
other unobservable sources. In this scenario, financing constraints become less consequential
as those who want to invest more—high A students, have enough funds to do so and do
not need to take out a loan. For this reason, if one runs counterfactual experiments with
a positive (negative) correlation between shocks to unobservable wealth and ability, the
estimate of welfare loss due to the financing constraint would be lower (higher). This may
not be the case though if one re-estimates the model parameters under the assumption of
a nonzero structural correlation. The estimation toolbox re-sets the parameters, including
friction wedges and unconditional mean and std of initial wealth, in order to match the same
data moments as in the benchmark estimate—including average and std of loans and the
mass of bunching on the federal loan boundaries that identify friction wedge parameters.
Hence, implications of the assumption for welfare loss due to frictions overall is not clear.
Nevertheless, I re-estimate the model under various nonzero structural correlations between
unobservable shocks to ability and wealth as a robustness test and redo counterfactual
experiments. Results are reported in columns three to six in table 1.19. The robustness
exercise has been done for correlation values of −1 (the min possible value), −0.5, +0.5,
and +1 (the max possible value). Estimates are compared with the benchmark case—zero
correlation, reported in the first column. Estimation Results for nonzero correlation cases are
overall quantitatively similar to the benchmark estimates. The loss due to financing frictions
is in the range $5-10B—close to the benchmark estimate $8B, and frictions only marginally
explain the investment gap. In any case, making public college tuition-free mainly benefits
the rich and comes with a substantial deadweight loss of at least $15B.
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1.6.3. Endogenous Tuition
I do not assume that tuition is exogenous in the demand estimation. Tuition may be
an endogenous choice of a college, depending most importantly on the unobservable (by
econometricians) component of the education quality at the college level, δu in equation (V).
As I discussed in section 1.4.1, the identification strategy that I employ in estimating the
price elasticity of demand is immune to an endogenous relationship between tuition charged
by a college and the unobservable education quality of that college and its competitors.
However, in the counterfactual analysis in section 1.5 I assume that colleges do not reset the
tuition in a new market equilibrium upon a loan or grant expansion policy and results depict
rather a “partial equilibrium” response. One can imagine that as making public colleges
tuition-free significantly reduces the share of private colleges, such colleges endogenously
reduce tuition—eliminate the markup over marginal cost—to retake the market share. This
endogenous response would further help to relax financing constraints and benefit students,
especially those for whom a private college is the first best match. Students would eventually
switch less which reduces government expenditure overall as well. The reverse can happen
for the direction of change in welfare and policy budget in the case of expanding federal Pell
grants. As students in both private and public colleges may qualify for Pell grants, grant
generosity results in an increase in demand for all college types and a change in demand
elasticity that induces an endogenous increase in tuition charged by private colleges. Hence,
colleges share the benefit of expanding Pell grants with students, which means that to deliver
the same benefit as in making public colleges tuition-free government needs to expand grants
to a higher extent and spend relatively more.
To provide a broader market equilibrium picture, I first estimate the marginal cost and
markup for colleges in the US. In the context of a Bertrand competition model, I assume that,
given the price of other colleges, financing constraints for students, and institutional details,
which determines the demand scheme of students for a specific college, a college maximizes
total revenue from tuition, net of the total enrollment times a constant marginal cost of
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providing education plus a nonpecuniary benefit per pupil that stakeholder may possibly
assign to providing higher education to the public. Details of the colleges’ optimization
problem are provided in the appendix section A.2. By assuming a constant marginal cost
I am focusing on a long-run supply response, in which colleges may potentially expand or
shrink unlimitedly in terms of enrollment capacity. I then use FOCs for the optimal markup
as the solution to the colleges’ optimization problem together with the estimated demand
elasticity and observed demand and tuition to back out the marginal cost net of nonpecuniary
values of educating students. The supplementary table A.7 shows estimates of net marginal
costs for private nonprofit and for-profit colleges. Median markup is around $6,000 for both
types of private colleges—around one-third of the base tuition net of institutional grants
(grants paid by a school to each student on average).
The estimated markup gives us a hint on the extent to which tuition may change endogenously upon making public colleges tuition-free. As an extreme scenario suppose private
colleges reduce their net tuition by 33%—roughly the estimated median markup, which
means profits become zero for private colleges to just survive. Table 1.19, seventh column
(scenario 1 under endogenous tuition tab) reports counterfactual results. Students would
switch back to private colleges to some degree, so relative to the benchmark the government
needs to pay less subsidy for making public colleges tuition-free. Students’ surplus would
go up as well relative to the benchmark as there would be a transfer of profit from private
colleges to students via the cut on the tuition. Therefore, the “deadweight loss” measured
by the gap in policy budget and student surplus would reduce to nearly zero, although it
is still positive. Nevertheless, the government still pays more than $50B for the program,
and the subsidy, as in the benchmark case, is distributed disproportionately among low- and
high-income students. As an alternative scenario, I report counterfactual results in case private colleges reduce net tuition by one-sixth upon the policy of tuition-free public colleges,
which means median markup is cut roughly in half. Results are shown in the last column
of table 1.19. Results are quantitatively close to the benchmark estimates and the gap in
policy budget and change in student surplus would again be substantial at about $10B. To
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assess the policy of expanding federal Pell grants as an alternative to making public colleges
tuition-free, I assume that in each scenario private colleges raise tuition by half of the implied increase in revenue from Pell, assuming that low-income students and private colleges
benefit on a 50-50 basis from more generous federal grants. The government needs to spend
more overall to deliver the same benefit to students. Nonetheless, government spending in
any scenario is still much less than in making public colleges tuition-free for all.
1.6.4. Consumption During College and College-Related Ability
In my model, I assume consuming more during college only provides direct utility, and does
not impact college-related ability and so education achievement. One can say more student
loans (as the main result of the frictionless counterfactual outcome) raises consumption
without a need to work during college, and more consumption results in a higher collegerelated ability, higher return to college studies, and greater education achievements.
To assess this missing mechanism in my model, I follow the identification approach in the
empirical setup of Black et al. (2020). The idea is to use the radical change in federal Stafford
student loan limits in 2006-7 and 2008-9 as a natural experiment in a reduced form setup
with the subsample of students with a total loan equal to or greater than the pre-policy
limits as the treatment group—“Financially constrained” students—and those with a lower
loan than pre-policy limits as the control group—“unconstrained” students. Then I assess
the impact of student loans on degree attainment in a diff-in-diff analysis. I use the recent
release of BPS data—BPS:12/17, which is based on the cohort of first-time college enrollees
in 2011-2012 as the post-policy sample. Regression results are shown in the supplementary
table A.6, columns 1-3. I simulate the same change in loan limits for the cohort of firsttime college enrollees in 2003-4 as the sample in my benchmark estimation and report the
diff-in-diff simulated regression results in the last column.
In both data and simulated results financially constrained students take out more loans
relatively in the post-policy environment. Point estimates are economically sizable and
statistically significant. Simulated regressions deliver similar results with data. However,
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even with this sizable first-stage result, there is no statistically significant impact for bachelor
degree attainment as the left-hand-side variable in data. Simulation diff-in-diff estimate
again follow the pattern in data. Point estimates are nearly zero, but statistical power
is not ideal and one may not precisely quantify the aforementioned mechanism. In any
case, standard errors are one order of magnitude less than the gap in degree attainment
between low- and high-income students; therefore, the key result, being financing friction
and imperfect access to student loans is not the key determinant of the investment gap
between rich and poor students, seems to be robust with respect to consider a direct impact
of loans and consumption during college on college-related ability, persistence in college, and
degree achievement.25

1.7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I find that it is not because of financing constraints that poor students
invest much less in college education than rich students. This is why the investment gap
would prevail even upon the policy of making public colleges tuition-free, which would make
wealthier students the main recipients of the subsidy. Therefore, making public colleges
tuition-free is indeed a regressive policy. To address education inequality, one rather needs
to focus on college-preparedness and determinants of (perceived) value-added of college
education for less-privileged students ahead of college-going ages. Meanwhile, as a policy
specific for higher education, expanding need-based grants such as federal Pell grants would
give students the flexibility to use the subsidy for tuition payments in both public and private
colleges and also for living costs during college besides the direct costs of tuition and fees.
Hence, the same benefit for lower-income students could be achieved as in tuition-free public
colleges with a significantly less deadweight loss. Moreover, the government would not need
to disproportionately subsidize wealthier students, which considerably saves on budget.

25

Black et al. (2020) report a positive and marginally significant estimate for the impact of the policy
on bachelor degree attainment. Results are based on the administrative data for the state of Texas and
assess the impact of policy as an unexpected shock for already enrolled students. And estimates are positive
and significant only for students in 4-year degree colleges. Overall their point estimates are of the order of
standard errors in my regression results. Note that regressions in my study use BPS data which is a survey
with universal coverage on US college enrollees.
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1.8. Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Students’ attributes by income background
Income background:

1st Quartile

2nd Quartile

3rd Quartile

parents have college
studies, fraction (%)

32.0

46.7

60.2

82.5

(1.9)

(1.7)

(1.6)

(1.0)

high-school GPA≥ 3,
fraction (%)

62.0

69.4

78.0

80.0

(2.1)

(1.7)

(1.3)

(1.2)

took SAT, fraction (%)

84.7

87.3

93.8

96.8

(1.6)

(1.4)

(0.8)

(0.6)

904

1004

1042

1099

(7)

(7)

(6)

(5)

194

191

179

189

(5)

(4)

(4)

(3)

47.4

49.3

50.6

56.3

(2.0)

(1.6)

(1.4)

(1.3)

SAT score, mean

SAT score, std

sibling in college,
fraction (%)

4th Quartile

Notes. This table reports summary statistics for attributes of US students, first time enrolled full time in
college in 2003-04 below the age of 21 as dependent individuals, by parents’ income rank in 2002. Percentiles
25th, 50th, and 75th estimates of parents’ income for high-school graduates, $36,700, $70,700, and $119,600
in 2019 dollars, respectively, is used to categorize students. Mean and std of SAT is reported for those
who took the test (91% of the sample). The average (standard deviation) for all income quartiles is 1032
(199). The range of SAT score is from 500 to 1600. Numbers in parentheses show standard errors. Source:
BPS:04/09.
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Table 1.2: Investment in college education by income background
Income background:

1st Quartile

2nd Quartile

3rd Quartile

4th Quartile

Enroll in college (%)

45.0 (1.6)

57.1 (1.5)

69.7 (1.5)

78.1 (1.5)

- Dropout (%)
- Associate degree (%)
- Bachelor’s degree (%)

27.6 (1.8)
19.5 (1.6)
52.9 (2.0)

23.2 (1.7)
15.2 (1.3)
61.6 (1.9)

15.2 (1.0)
14.6 (1.1)
70.2 (1.4)

10.7 (0.9)
9.1 (1.1)
80.2 (1.3)

Tuition ($)

8920 (300)

10000 (310)

9970 (240)

14250 (290)

Notes. Degree attainment and average tuition is reported for US college students, first time enrolled full time
in college in 2003-04 below the age of 21 as dependent individuals, by parents’ income rank in 2002. Enrollment likelihood is estimated for high school graduates in 2003 based on college enrollment data throughout
2007 by family income rank in 2001. Percentiles 25th, 50th, and 75th estimates of parents’ income for highschool graduates, $36,700, $70,700, and $119,600 in 2019 dollars, respectively, is used to categorize students.
Degree attainment percentages and average tuition are all reported for students, conditional on enrollment.
Average tuition is reported in 2019 dollars. Numbers in parentheses show data standard errors. Source:
ELS:2002 and BPS:04/09.
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Table 1.3: College choice by income background
College type
Income background

community

for-profit

public 4yr

private nonprofit

Total

100%

Panel A: Data
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile

36.9%

8.5%

35.1%

19.5%

(1.9)

(2.3)

(1.6)

(1.3)

31.1%

4.6%

41.6%

22.8%

(1.6)

(1.1)

(1.4)

(1.2)

27.7%

2.5%

48.6%

21.2%

(1.3)

(0.8)

(1.3)

(0.9)

16.5%

0.5%

50.9%

32.1%

(1.0)

(0.2)

(1.1)

(0.9)

100%
100%
100%

Panel B: Simulation (benchmark estimation)
1st Quartile

37.3%

3.7%

37.8%

21.2%

100%

2nd Quartile

28.2%

2.9%

41.9%

27.0%

100%

3rd Quartile

23.1%

2.0%

49.3%

25.6%

100%

4th Quartile

18.6%

2.1%

52.8%

26.6%

100%

Panel C: Simulation (counterfactual: θ = 0)
1st Quartile

26.8%

2.4%

46.6%

24.3%

100%

2nd Quartile

25.4%

2.1%

44.8%

27.7%

100%

3rd Quartile

26.6%

2.3%

45.8%

25.3%

100%

4th Quartile

23.7%

3.1%

48.7%

24.5%

100%

Notes. This table shows the type of the first college a student attended: public- two-year (community),
private for-profit, public four-year, or private non-for-profit, by parents’ income rank. Panel A reports the
data for US students, first time enrolled full time in college in 2003-04 below the age of 21 as dependent
individuals by income rank in 2002. Panel B shows the simulation results of the estimated model. Panel C
shows the simulation results of the estimated model, except that the parameter θ is set to zero. I reset fixed
effect terms {δs }s∈S and {δu }u∈U , so that given θ = 0, the enrollment shares and entry rates, unconditionally,
for colleges and students is as in the data. Percentiles 25th, 50th, and 75th estimates of parents’ income
for high-school graduates, $36,700, $70,700, and $119,600 in 2019 dollars, respectively, is used to categorize
students. Numbers in parentheses show standard errors. Data source: BPS:04/09.
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Table 1.4: Colleges’ characteristics by college type
community

for-profit

public 4yr

private nonprofit

Tuition and fees ($)
In-state tuition discount ($)
Institution grants ($)
Faculty salaries ($)

7360
4060
1400
2680

17950
—
1920
1780

16950
10600
3900
4920

25330
—
11990
5860

Graduation rate (%)
4-year degree, fraction

27.5
0

48.4
0.62

57.2
1

63.1
0.98

Open admission, fraction
Admission rate (%)
p25(SAT) enrollees
p75(SAT) enrollees

0.94
99.1
762
991

0.38
81.3
861
1043

0.07
72.4
966
1162

0.06
67.3
1027
1227

Number of colleges
Enrollment, share of all (%)
Enrollment (#1,000)

940
25.4
415

340
2.5
42

571
46.6
761

1077
25.4
415

Notes. This table shows averages, weighted by number of enrollees, of colleges’ characteristics in the academic
year 2003-04, by college type: public two-year (community), private for-profit, public four-year, and private
non-for-profit. Institution grants is school grants per enrollees, not per grant recipient. Faculty salary reports
total salary to faculties normalized with number of enrollees. Enrollment (last row) reports total number of
first-time first-year full-time degree-seeking undergraduate US students. I scale enrollment numbers at the
type by degree level using data from BPS:04/09 to approximate for dependent enrollees aged 21 or younger.
Tuition and fees, in-state tuition discount, institution grants, and faculty salary are reported in 2019 dollars.
Data source: IPEDS:2003-04.
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Table 1.5: Distribution of student loans by income background

10th%

percentiles ($)
25th% 50th% 75th%

90th%

3,770

2,060

3,600

3,600

7,710

9,090

(500)

(240)

(20)

(0)

(850)

(700)

5,130

3,880

2,640

3,600

3,600

4,970

9,090

(170)

(250)

(320)

(0)

(0)

(640)

(490)

43.0

5,070

3,850

3,300

3,600

3,600

4,640

9,090

(1.3)

(140)

(240)

(240)

(0)

(0)

(530)

(410)

33.7

4,920

4,020

3,600

3,600

3,600

3,600

9,090

(1.1)

(130)

(280)

(90)

(0)

(0)

(110)

(530)

40.8

5,110

3,890

2,880

3,600

3,600

4,800

9,090

(0.5)

(80)

(150)

(170)

(0)

(0)

(260)

(250)

Income
background

% positive

cond.
mean ($)

cond.
std ($)

1st Quartile

41.6

5,410

(2.1)

(300)

47.1
(1.5)

2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile
all

Notes. This table reports fraction of students with a positive loan, mean and std of loans conditional on
receiving a loan, and percentiles (excluding zeros) of the total loan: sum of federal, state, institutional,
and private student loans, in the academic year 2003-04 for US students, first time enrolled full time in
college in 2003-04 below the age of 21 as dependent individuals, by parents’ income rank in 2002. Loan
amounts are reported in 2019 dollars. Percentiles 25th, 50th, and 75th estimates of parents’ income for
high-school graduates, $36,700, $70,700, and $119,600 in 2019 dollars, respectively, is used to categorize
students. Numbers in parentheses show standard errors. Source: BPS:04/09.
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Table 1.6: College education vs. family background and college-related ability
Panel A: College enrollment
Data

log (enrollment odds)
log (family income)

Simulation

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.707∗∗∗

0.574∗∗∗

0.100∗∗

0.179∗∗∗

(0.033)

(0.035)

(0.042)

(0.062)

✓

parents’ education
SAT score, high-school GPA
Pell grant eligibility

✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

0.071
✓
✓
✓

Panel B: Degree attainment
Data

log (bachelor’s degree odds)
log (family income)

Simulation

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.580∗∗∗

0.443∗∗∗

0.185∗∗∗

0.365∗∗∗

(0.045)

(0.053)

(0.057)

(0.062)

✓

parents’ education
SAT score, high-school GPA
total grants

✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

(3)

(4)

0.351
✓
✓
✓

Panel C: Tuition and fees
Data

log (tuition)
log (family income)

Simulation

(1)

(2)

0.226∗∗∗

0.170∗∗∗

0.040∗∗

0.219∗∗∗

(0.024)

(0.025)

(0.021)

(0.021)

✓

parents’ education
SAT score, high-school GPA
total grants

✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

0.239
✓
✓
✓

Notes. Panel A, Data tabs show the logistic regression of college enrollment throughout 2007 for high school
graduates in 2003 on family income in 2001; number of observations is 11,360 and survey population is 2.7
million. Based on federal need-based Pell grant data for college enrollees, the variable ‘Pell grant eligibility’
is constructed by assuming that only students with a family income below $36,100 (in 2019 dollars) are
eligible for the grant. Panels B and C, Data tabs, report the logistic regression of attaining a bachelor’s
degree throughout 2009, and the OLS regression of tuition and fees paid in 2003-04, for first-time and firstyear dependent college enrollees below the age of 21, versus parents’ income in 2002; number of observations
is 8,720 and survey population is 1.7 million. Simulation tabs report the median of the slope of the same
regression models on 300 simulations of the estimated model. Numbers in parentheses show standard errors.
∗

Data source: ELS:2002 & BPS:04/09.
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p < 0.1

∗∗

p < 0.05

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Table 1.7: Tuition and fees for financially constrained students
Data

log (Tuition and fees)

log (parents’ income)

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.241***
(0.026)

0.242***
(0.026)

0.251***
(0.023)

0.275

-0.066**
(0.027)

-0.042*
(0.022)

0.008

-0.076**
(0.033)

-0.056

1 {sibling in college}
1 {total loan = Stafford limits}

log (total grants)

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

4,490

4,490
1,850
8,720

✓

log (federal loans)
SAT score, high-school GPA
age, gender, race
parents’ education, family size
# {siblings in college} = Yes
# [ total loan = Stafford limits ]
Observations:

Simulation

✓
✓
✓

8,720

8,720

Notes. Data tabs reports OLS estimation of tuition and fees paid by US students, first time enrolled full time
in college in the academic year 2003-04 below the age of 21 as dependent individuals, versus parents’ income
in 2002, an indicator for students with a sibling in college in or before 2003-4, and an indicator for students
with total loans being equal to federal Stafford limits for subsidized loans ($3,600 or $4,800 in 2019 dollars,
depending on class level) and unsubsidized loans ($9,085 or $10,285 in 2019 dollars, depending on class level,
for those whose parents are denied for a federal PLUS loan due to poor credit and $3,600 or $4,800 in 2019
dollars, depending on class level, for the rest) in the academic year 2003-04. Survey population is 1.7 million.
Simulation tab reports the median of the slope of the OLS regression coefficients of 300 simulations of the
estimated model. Numbers in parentheses show standard errors. Data source: BPS:04/09.
∗∗

p < 0.05

∗∗∗

p < 0.01
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∗

p < 0.1

Figure 1.1: Faculty salaries and students’ SAT scores’ data and simulation

Notes. Y-axis shows faculty salaries in colleges that students of different SAT scores shown in the x-axis
enroll in. Gray circles shows simulation results in the benchmark estimation for each student with a specific
SAT score in the survey. Circle sizes indicate observation weights in the survey. The solid black line is a
linear fit to simulation outcomes. The dashed blue lines is a linear fit to data outcome (the interval of +/-2
standard deviation of data slope estimate is plotted in blue-dashed lines as well). The dashed-dotted red
line is a linear fit to a counterfactual simulation outcome with θ = 0. In this counterfactual simulation I
reset fixed effect terms {δs }s∈S and {δu }u∈U , so that given θ = 0, the enrollment shares and entry rates,
unconditionally, for colleges and students is as in the data.
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Figure 1.2: The variation of price within a college and across colleges in a state
PA

NJ

private

×

public
✓ in-state tuition discount + state grants.

Table 1.8: Substitution of in- for out-of-state students by tuition discounts
log odds of out- vs.
in-state enrollees
in-state discount ($1,000)
in-state discount ($1,000)
×1{below median income}

Data

Simulation

−0.069
−0.035

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

−0.060∗∗∗

−0.059∗∗∗

−0.060∗∗∗

−0.044∗∗∗

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.008)

0.003

0.007

−0.008

−0.016∗∗

(0.010)

(0.010)

(0.009)

(0.007)

✓

✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

2,145
1,319

2,145
1,319

2,145
1,319

Proximity
State FE
Controls
# Colleges
# Enrollees (1,000)

2,145
1,319

Notes. The unit of observation is a college. The left-hand-side variable is the logarithm of out-of-state
divided by in-state first-time full-time enrollees. The key right-hand-side variable is in-state tuition discount plus average state grants per in-state enrollees at the college level, in unit of one thousand 2019
dollars. The variable ‘proximity’ measures how close a college is to in- versus out-of-state populated counties: prox.(¬state(u))u − prox.(state(u))u , where the function prox.(S)u is proximity of college u to people
P
in the region set S, defined as prox.(S)u := c∈S Nc /(D0 + Dcu ); here the sum is over all counties (indexed
by c) in the region set S; Nc is population of county c; Dcu is the distance in miles between the centroid of
county c and college u; D0 represents the ‘diameter’ of a county—calibrated to a median value 30 miles. The
set of controls includes the logarithm of total enrollees; whether a college offers distance learning and weekend
classes; open admission indicator, admission rate, and whether SAT and high-school GPA is required in the
application; graduation rate and average SAT of enrollees in recent years. College type dummies indicating
community, public 4 year, for-profit and private nonprofit colleges; the logarithm of faculty salaries; and an
indicator for four- vs. two-year degree colleges. Observations are weighted by total number of enrollees. To
avoid noisy observations, I exclude colleges with less than 5% in- or out-of-state enrollees, and winsorize
colleges with a reported state grant plus tuition discount of more than $20,000. I also exclude colleges that
flag more that 2.5% of enrolled students as unknown permanent residency. Data source: IPEDS:2003-04.
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𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐴)

𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐴)

Figure 1.3: Optimal loan policy with and without financing frictions
state – space

state - space
ത
𝐿∗ > 𝐿𝑐 > 𝐿
+ Private loan

𝐿∗ = 𝐿ത

+ Private loan

𝐿∗ = 𝐿ത

𝐿∗ > 𝐿ത

Stafford/No loan

𝐿 < 𝐿ത
∗

𝐿𝑐 = 𝐿ത < 𝐿∗

Stafford/No loan

ത
𝐿𝑐 = 𝐿∗ < 𝐿

𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ (𝑚)

𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ (𝑚)

Frictionless World

Introduce Friction ( 𝜂 > 0 )

Notes. This figure is a graphical illustration of the optimal loan policy in a frictionless world (L∗ ) and in
the case with external-financing frictions (Lc ). L̄ represents the federal Stafford loan limit.

Figure 1.4: The distribution of student loans; data and simulation
100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

0

3,600

9,085

15,000

Notes. This graph shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of total student loans in data, benchmark estimation, and counterfactual simulations with financing friction wedges ηu = 0 and ηp = 0. Jumps in
the CDF shows bunching at federal Stafford loan limits. Note that CDF (L) shows the fraction of students
with a student loan amount smaller than L. The maximum program limit on federal subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford loans are $3, 600 and $9, 085 for students whose parents are ineligible for federal PLUS loans
due to poor credit history (category 1); for students whose parents are eligible for PLUS loans (category
2) the program limits are $3, 600. Students from lower-income families are more likely to fall into category
1. Note that the actual limit on subsidized Stafford loan is less than the program limit for students with a
large ‘Expected Family Contribution’. See details in section 1.3.2. Limits here are reported in 2019 dollars.
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Table 1.9: Targeted moments to identify the model parameters
Moment

Helps to identify...

cov (matched attributes & characteristics)
var (matched attributes | characteristics)
mean (distance from home to college)

heterogeneous taste for colleges (θ, Π, Γ)
variance of unobservable ability (π1 )
disutility to distant colleges (χ)

fraction (dropout & associate)
cov (attributes, dropout)
cov (dropout, college GPA)

value to degree (g d , g a )
exog. factor to drop out (λ)
shock to ability (π2 )

colleges’ market shares
students’ entry rate

mean taste for colleges ({δu }u∈U )
mean taste for students ({δs }s∈S )

cov (in-state college choice, tuition discount)

price elasticity (ζ −1 )

mean, var (self-financing, tuition)
fraction (nearby college)

family financial support (m)
family housing support (h)

fraction (loan>0), mean (loan|loan > 0)
fraction (loan=Lsub ), mean (loan|loan > Lsub )
fraction (loan=Ltot ), mean (loan|loan > Ltot )

fixed cost to take a loan (f0 )
unsubsidized loan, friction wedge (ηu )
private loan, friction wedge (ηp )
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Table 1.10: Data and simulated targeted moments
Parents’ income:

1st Quartile
model
data

Enroll in college (%)
Nearby college (%)
log(Distance)
Tuition ($)
4-year college (%)
Faculty salaries ($)
Dropout (%)
Bachelor’s degree (%)

44.9
66.0
4.17
8460
60.6
3680
23.3
59.0

positive Loan (%)
mean Loan ($)
at Stafford limits (%)

40.6 41.6 (2.1)
6030 5410 (300)
25.9 23.2 (1.6)

2nd Quartile
model
data

3rd Quartile
model
data

4th Quartile
model
data

45.0 (1.6) 57.1 57.1 (1.5)
69.7 69.7 (1.5) 78.1 78.1 (1.5)
65.5 (2.2) 55.1 56.0 (2.0)
46.9 49.0 (1.8) 39.4 36.0 (1.6)
4.19 (0.04) 4.37 4.35 (0.04) 4.45 4.44 (0.03) 4.57 4.82 (0.03)
8920 (300) 11150 10000 (310) 11630 9970 (240) 12790 14250 (290)
60.0 (2.1) 70.4 66.4 (1.5)
75.8 70.9 (1.3) 80.2 82.8 (1.1)
3730 (110) 4410 4150 (80)
4630 4470 (90) 4960 5320 (90)
27.6 (1.8) 18.7 23.1 (1.7)
15.5 15.2 (1.0) 11.0 10.8 (0.9)
53.0 (2.0) 67.9 61.6 (1.9)
73.8 70.2 (1.4) 81.8 80.2 (1.3)
43.3 47.1 (1.5)
5320 5130 (170)
30.6 30.5 (1.3)

43.4 43.0 (1.3)
4770 5070 (140)
30.9 28.5 (1.2)

31.8 33.7 (1.1)
4880 4920 (130)
21.7 23.7 (1.0)

Notes. All moments in this table, except the first row ‘Enroll in college’, measure averages over students,
conditional on college enrollment. The row: ‘mean Loan’, reports the average loan, conditional on receiving
a loan. Percentiles 25th, 50th, and 75th estimates of parents’ income for high-school graduates, $36,700,
$70,700, and $119,600 in 2019 dollars, respectively, is used to categorize students. All moments with dollar unit are reported in 2019 dollars. Numbers in parentheses show data standard errors. Data source:
BPS:04/09 and ELS:2002.
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Table 1.11: Students’ college-related ability, point estimates
Panel A: Variance decomposition of college-related ability A = Π′ D + π1 ν + π2 ρ
College preparedness
Observable attributes (Π′ D)
% of Total variance

Realized in
College (π2 ρ)

Unobservable (π1 ν)

30.8

50.9

18.4

Panel B: Observable preparedness (Π′ D) vs. family background
Parents’ income

Min

Median

Max

Mean

Std

1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile

0.4
0.78
0.98
1.01

2.3
2.96
3.31
3.72

5.17
5.28
5.44
5.61

2.37
2.9
3.24
3.61

0.89
0.93
0.87
0.9

All

0.4

3.18

5.61

3.12

1

Panel C: Marginal informativeness of attributes for observable college preparedness
var(

Attribute (Dj )
family college experience
high-school GPA
parents’ income
SAT score

P

i

P
Πi Di )−var( i̸=j Πi Di )
P
var( i Πi Di )

0.098
0.339
0.069
0.832

Notes. Panel A shows the variance of each component of college-related ability, i.e., observable, unobservable,
and the shock during college, scaled by the total variance of college-related ability across population: 100 ∗
var(Π′ D)/var(A), 100 ∗ var(π1 ν)/var(A), 100 ∗ var(π2 ρ)/var(A), respectively. Panel B reports statistics
of the observable college preparedness for each income group. The minimum possible value is set to zero,
which is assigned to a student with no SAT, high-school GPA below 3, no parent with college experience,
no sibling enrolled in college, and the minimum parents’ income in the sample. The standard deviation
across all students is normalized to 1. Percentiles 25th, 50th, and 75th estimates of parents’ income for
high-school graduates, $36,700, $70,700, and $119,600 in 2019 dollars, respectively, is used to categorize
students. Panel C reports the marginal informativeness of components of the vector of observable attributes
P
D for the observed college preparedness Π′ D = i Πi Di . The marginal informativeness of an attribute j
is defined as the share of variations in the
observablePcollege preparedness Π′ D that is not captured by the
P
single observable attribute Dj , i.e.,

var(

i

Πi Di )−var( i̸=j Πi Di )
P
.
var( i Πi Di )

As observable attributes covary with each

other the sum of marginal informativeness of all attributes is greater than one. Family college experience
includes an indicates for parents’ college studies and whether a sibling has enrolled or is enrolling in college.
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Table 1.12: Colleges’ education quality, point estimates
Panel A: Observable education quality (H = Γ′ X) vs. college type
College type

Min

Median

Max

Mean

Std

community
for-profit
public 4-year
private nonprofit

0.29
0.23
0.85
0.49

0.89
1.38
2.75
2.93

2
3.71
4
4.41

0.93
1.33
2.69
2.81

0.27
0.43
0.6
0.82

All

0.23

2.53

4.41

2.24

1

Panel B: Informativeness of characteristics for observable education quality
P
P
var( i Γi Xi )−var( i̸=j Γi Xi )
P
var( i Γi Xi )

Characteristic (Xj )
admission policy
cohort quality
degrees offered: 4- vs. 2-year
faculty salaries, per enrollees

0.139
0.921
0.175
0.169

Notes. Panel A reports statistics of the observable education quality H = Γ′ X for all college types. The
minimum possible value is set to zero, which is assigned to a college with open admission, the minimum
faculty salaries per enrollees in the sample, the lowest graduation rate, and the lowest 75th percentile of
SAT score of enrollees prior to 2003-04, which only offer a two-year degree. The standard deviation across
all colleges is normalized to 1. Average, median, and standard deviation are calculated within each college
type using the number of first-time and first-year enrollees as observation weights. Panel B reports the
marginal informativeness of components of the vector of observable characteristics X for the observable
P
college quality H = Γ′ X =
i Γi Xi . The marginal informativeness of a characteristic j is defined as
the share of variations in P
the observedPeducation quality H that is not captured by the single observable
characteristic Xj , i.e,

var(

i

Γi Xi )−var( i̸=j Γi Xi )
P
.
var( i Γi Xi )

As observable characteristics covary with each other the

sum of marginal informativeness of all characteristic is greater than one. Admission policy includes an
indicator for colleges with open admission policy and also the admission rate (number of enrollees / number
of applicants) for the rest. Cohort quality refers to the graduation rate of enrollees and the 75th percentile
of SAT scores of enrollees prior to the academic year 2003-04.

72

Table 1.13: Students’ degree choice w.r.t degree value and shocks to ability
Panel A: Dropouts, conditional on enrollment (%)
Parents’ income
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile

Benchmark
estimation
23.3
18.7
15.5
11

Counterfactual
(ρ = 0) (λ = 0) (ρ = 0, λ = 0) (gd = 0) (ρ = 0, gd = 0, λ = 0)
22.3
17.2
13.7
9.4

8.4
8
6.8
5.7

0.7
1.8
1.5
2.4

6.2
4.5
3.3
2

0
0
0
0

Panel B: Enrollment rate (%)
Parents’ income
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile

Benchmark
estimation
44.9
57.1
69.7
78.1

Counterfactual
(ρ = 0) (λ = 0) (ρ = 0, λ = 0) (gd = 0) (ρ = 0, gd = 0, λ = 0)
43.9
56
68.7
77.5

35
49.8
63.8
74.9

33.3
48.5
62.9
74

39.9
53.1
66
75.8

33.1
48
62.4
72.9

Panel C: Associate degree attained (%)
Parents’ income
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile

Benchmark
estimation
7.9
7.7
7.5
5.6

Counterfactual
(ρ = 0) (λ = 0) (ρ = 0, λ = 0) (gd = 0) (ρ = 0, gd = 0, λ = 0)
7.5
7
6.6
4.7

0.3
0.5
0.5
0.2

0.2
0.4
0.2
0.1

8.4
8.6
8.4
6.6

0.3
0.5
0.4
0.3

Panel D: Bachelor’s degree attained (%)
Parents’ income
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile

Benchmark
estimation
26.5
38.7
51.4
63.9

Counterfactual
(ρ = 0) (λ = 0) (ρ = 0, λ = 0) (gd = 0) (ρ = 0, gd = 0, λ = 0)
26.6
39.4
52.7
65.6

31.7
45.3
58.9
70.5

32.8
47.2
61.7
72.1

29.1
42.2
55.4
67.7

32.9
47.5
62
72.6

Notes. Panel A shows dropout ratio for college enrollees. Panels B shows the fraction of high-school graduates
who enroll in college. Panels C and D report the fraction of high-school graduates who attain an associate
or a bachelor’s degree. First column shows the benchmark estimates. Other columns show counterfactual
estimates in the absence of shock to ability (ρ > 0), exogenous shocks to degree choice (λ > 0), and intrinsic
value to drop out (gd > 0). Percentiles 25th, 50th, and 75th estimates of parents’ income for high-school
graduates, $36,700, $70,700, and $119,600 in 2019 dollars, respectively, is used to categorize students.
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Table 1.14: The perceived cost of student loans; average return rate estimates
Income background:
Federal Subsidized
Subsidized & Unsubsidized
Federal and Private Loans

1st Quartile

2nd Quartile

3rd Quartile

4th Quartile

2.12 (.11)
2.94 (.08)
5.94 (.13)

2.08 (.06)
3.59 (.08)
7.99 (.11)

2.07 (.05)
4.80 (.13)
9.16 (.13)

2.00 (.05)
5.85 (.18)
10.34 (.17)

Notes. This table presents the perceived net average return rate on student loans in percentage units per
annum ( C(L)
− 1) ∗ 100 in the academic year 2003-04, across students of different backgrounds taking only
L
federal subsidized loans (first row), subsidized and unsubsidized loans (second row), and both federal and
private loans (third row). The fixed cost f0 is included in the calculation of perceived average rates; see
specification (L). Recall that the 10-year treasury rate is 3.53%. Percentiles 25th, 50th, and 75th estimates
of parents’ income for high-school graduates, $36,700, $70,700, and $119,600 in 2019 dollars, respectively, is
used to categorize students. Numbers in parentheses show estimation standard errors.

Table 1.15: The perceived cost of student loans; marginal return rate estimates

Federal Subsidized
Federal Unsubsidized
Private Loans

median (r)

∆r/∆income

∆r/∆SAT

1.89
4.39 (.13)
11.59 (.17)

-0.03
1.01 (.12)
1.68 (.13)

-0.15
0.36 (.05)
1.02 (.20)

Notes. This table presents the perceived net marginal return rate on federal subsidized loans, unsubsidized
loans, and private loans in percentage units per annum r = ( ∂C(L)
− 1) ∗ 100 in the academic year 2003∂L
04. See the specification (L); recall that the 10-year treasury rate is set to 3.53%. In the second and
third columns, variation of r with respect to family income and students’ SAT is reported. ∆income :=
p75(parents′ income)−p25(parents′ income) and ∆SAT := p75(SAT )−p25(SAT ). Numbers in parentheses
show estimation standard errors.
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Table 1.16: Counterfactual analysis; no financing friction, expanding federal loans
Parents’ income:

Low income

High income

Estimation

Lift Loan Limits

No Friction

Estimation

Enroll in college (%)
Nearby college (%)
Tuition ($)
Bachelor’s degree (%)

51.0
59.9
9970
64.0

51.2
59.6
10040
63.9

53.1
56.4
10640
62.9

73.9
42.9
12240
78.0

positive Loan (%)
mean Loan ($)
at Stafford limits (%)

42.1
5620
28.6

42.4
6780
24.7

45.7
14890
6.8

37.2
4820
26.0

Notes. The first and the fourth columns reports the results of the benchmark estimation, for students whose
parents’ income is below median: ‘low income’, and above median: ‘high income’. The second column shows
the counterfactual results of lifting federal Stafford loan limits from the pre 2006-07 to post 2008-09 values,
for low-income students. Specifically, for dependent first-year students whose parents are eligible for a PLUS
loan (group I) the limit on subsidized and unsubsidized loans is $2,625 in 2003-04; for dependent first-year
students whose parents are not eligible for a PLUS loan (group II) the limit on subsidized and unsubsidized
loans is $2,625 and $6,625, respectively. In 2008-09 the limit on subsidized and unsubsidized loans is lifted
to $3,500 and $5,500, respectively, for group I, and to $3,500 and $9,500 for group II. The third column
shows the counterfactual results of setting financing friction wedges, f0 , ηu and ηp to zero, for low-income
students. All variables in this table, except the first row ‘Enroll in college’, measure averages over students of
different income backgrounds, conditional on enrolling in college. The row ‘mean Loan’ reports the average
loan, conditional on receiving a loan. The median estimate of parents’ income for high-school graduates,
$70,700 in 2019 dollars, is used as the criteria to assign students into low- and high-income category. All
variables with dollar unit are reported in 2019 dollars.
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Table 1.17: Policy analysis; making public colleges tuition-free
Parents’ income:

1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile

All

Panel A: Pre-Policy
Enroll in college (%)
Distance ≤ 30 miles (%)
Enroll in priv. college (%)
Tuition ($)
Faculty salaries ($)
Dropout (%)
positive Loan (%)
cond. mean Loan ($)

44.9
66.0
32.5
8460
3680
23.3
40.6
6030

57.1
55.2
36.3
11150
4410
18.7
43.3
5320

69.7
46.9
32.4
11630
4630
15.5
43.4
4770

78.1
39.4
32.6
12790
4960
11.0
31.8
4880

62.5
49.9
33.3
11310
4510
16.2
39.2
5170

71.8
36.9
9.2
11610
4600
16.0
25.6
3800

79.8
31.3
10.8
13010
4960
11.5
16.4
3990

65.0
40.6
11.1
11290
4490
17.1
25.1
4290

Panel B: Post-Policy
Enroll in college (%)
Distance ≤ 30 miles (%)
Enroll in priv. college (%)
Tuition ($)
Faculty salaries ($)
Dropout (%)
positive Loan (%)
cond. mean Loan ($)

48.3
56.6
13.7
8560
3720
24.4
31.9
5120

60.2
44.7
12.1
10820
4350
19.7
30.8
4290

Panel C: Post- vs. Pre-Policy
∆
∆
∆
∆

[
[
[
[

Enrollment ] (p.p.)
Tuition ] (%)
College degree ] (p.p.)
Student Loans ] (%)

5.3
5.3
3.3
-28.3

1.0
0.8
0.7
-14.8

0.0
0.0
0.0
-0.9

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

1.6
0.4
1.0
-10.3

∆ [ Student Surplus ] ($B)
∆ [ Government Subsidy ] ($B)

5.0
6.3

3.1
3.4

0.2
0.2

0.0
0.0

8.4
9.9

Notes. In this policy experiment, the government pays for the tuition of students in public colleges; all
other institutional and fundamental variables, as well as students’ attributes and colleges’ characteristics
and tuition, are unchanged. In panels A and B, all variables, except ‘Enroll in college’, measure averages
over students of different income backgrounds, conditional on enrolling in college. Also the row: ‘mean
Loan’, reports the average loan, conditional on receiving a loan. Panel C reports percentage point change
in enrollment ratio and (unconditional on college enrollment) associate/bachelor’s degree attainment and
percent change in average tuition and student loans (unconditional on receiving a loan) amounts for college
enrollees; ∆ [Student Surplus] shows the change in students’ utility in dollar units (lifetime wealth equivalent
value) and ∆ [Government Subsidy] reports government expenditure the policy. Percentiles 25th, 50th, and
75th estimates of parents’ income for high-school graduates, $36,700, $70,700, and $119,600 in 2019 dollars,
respectively, is used to categorize students. All variables with dollar unit are reported in 2019 dollars.
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Table 1.18: Policy analysis; tuition-free colleges and expanding Pell grants
Parents’ income:

1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile

All

Panel A: Pre-Policy
Enroll in college (%)
Tuition ($)
College degree (%)
Student Loans ($)

44.9
8460
34.5
2450

57.1
11150
46.4
2300

69.7
11630
58.9
2070

78.1
12790
69.5
1550

62.5
11310
52.3
2030

Panel B: Post- vs. Pre-Policy, Making Public Colleges Tuition-Free
∆
∆
∆
∆

[
[
[
[

Enrollment ] (p.p.)
Tuition ] (%)
College degree ] (p.p.)
Student Loans ] (%)

3.4
1.2
2.0
-33.3

3.1
-2.9
1.9
-42.5

2.1
-0.2
1.4
-53.0

1.7
1.7
1.1
-57.9

2.6
-0.2
1.6
-46.9

∆ [ Student Surplus ] ($B)
∆ [ Government Subsidy ] ($B)

5.0
7.4

8.7
12.8

13.0
17.7

16.2
21.6

42.9
59.5

Panel C: Post- vs. Pre-Policy, Expanding Pell Grants
∆
∆
∆
∆

[
[
[
[

Enrollment ] (p.p.)
Tuition ] (%)
College degree ] (p.p.)
Student Loans ] (%)

5.3
5.3
3.3
-28.3

1.0
0.8
0.7
-14.8

0.0
0.0
0.0
-0.9

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

1.6
0.4
1.0
-10.3

∆ [ Student Surplus ] ($B)
∆ [ Government Subsidy ] ($B)

5.0
6.3

3.1
3.4

0.2
0.2

0.0
0.0

8.4
9.9

Notes. This table compares two policies: making public colleges tuition-free as detailed in table 1.17 and
expanding federal Pell grants. Under the policy of expanding the federal Pell grant the grant amount for all
grant recipients is increased by 140% (the maximum amount is increased from $5,500 to $13,500, in 2019
dollar), and grant eligibility is left unchanged. This increase in grant amount is set such that students’
surplus in the bottom income quartile increases by the same dollar value under two policies. All other
institutional and fundamental variables, as well as students’ attributes and colleges’ characteristics and
tuition, are unchanged. ‘Enroll in college’ and ‘College degree’ measure averages over high school graduates
of different income backgrounds, and ‘Tuition’ and ‘Student Loans’ reports averages conditional on enrolling
in college for first-year students. Panels B and C reports percentage point change in enrollment ratio and
associate/bachelor’s degree attainment and percent change in average tuition and student loans amounts;
∆ [Student Surplus] shows the change in students’ utility in dollar unit (lifetime wealth equivalent value)
and ∆ [Government Subsidy] reports what the government needs to pay for the policy. Percentiles 25th,
50th, and 75th estimates of parents’ income for high-school graduates, $36,700, $70,700, and $119,600 in
2019 dollars, respectively, is used to categorize students. All variables with dollar unit are reported in 2019
dollars.
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78

262
8.4

∆ [Student Loans] (%)

Welfare Gain ($B)

−1

−0.5

6.1

260

9.4
6.3

216

4.1
9.7

247

5.5

42.9
2.9
3.5

9.9

∆ [Student Surplus] ($B)

Subsidy Ratio, top to bottom quartile

Welfare Gain if no Frictions ($B)

∆ [ Government Subsidy ] ($B)

2.6

2.6

41.2

60.3

9.7

11.1

Panel C: Expanding Pell Grants

2.6

2.4

37.8

51.9

10.9

3.8

2.7

44

63

9.8

3.5

2.9

42

59.4

10

3.9

2.8

41.2

60.9

5.7

397

12

1

14.1

3.9

3

49.2

52.4

(1)

11.9

3.7

2.9

45.4

56.5

(2)

Endogenous tuition

Notes. This table reports key counterfactual results (in different rows) across robustness tests (in different columns). Three counterfactual analyses are done:
no frictions in student loans (details in section 1.5.1) in Panel A, and making public colleges tuition-free and expanding Pell grants (details in section 1.5.2)
in Panels B and C. The first row: ∆ [Investment] (% of gap), reports the change in investment in college education, defined as enrollment likelihood times
the time spent in college times tuition of the college a student enrolls in per year, upon the no financing frictions scenario for below-income-median students;
the change in investment is scaled with the estimated gap in investment between below- and above-median income students in the report. The second row:
∆ [Student Loans] (%), reports the increase in total (unconditional) student loan amounts across all students. The third row reports: Welfare Gain ($B),
reports the welfare gain for students in dollar units (students’ surplus) in case there were no financing frictions. The fourth row: ∆ [ Government Subsidy ]
($B), in the panel Making Public Colleges Tuition-free, reports total government expenditure for the policy, and the fifth row: ∆ [Student Surplus] ($B),
reports the increase in students’ utility in dollar units overall upon the policy. The sixth row: Subsidy Ratio, top to bottom quartile, reports the ratio of
subsidy paid to students of top- vs. bottom-income quartile families and the seventh row: Welfare Gain if no Frictions ($B), indicates the loss in welfare
because of financing frictions under the new regime with tuition-free public colleges. Lastly, the eighth row: ∆ [ Government Subsidy ] ($B), in the panel
Expanding Pell Grants, reports the government expenditure overall needed in expanding federal Pell grant as an alternative to making public colleges

59.5

∆ [ Government Subsidy ] ($B)

6.8

316

8.6

0.5

Corr. of wealth & ability shocks

Panel B: Making Public Colleges Tuition-Free

6.2

∆ [Investment] (% of gap)

No selective
college

Panel A: No Frictions in Student Loans

Benchmark

Table 1.19: Robustness checks
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tuition-free that delivers the same benefit to the bottom income quartile students. The first column: “Benchmark” reports results under the benchmark
model and data sample. The second column: “No selective college” reports results for a re-estimated model of the sub-sample with non-selective colleges
and with students of top SAT scores being excluded. Aggregate results with dollar units are re-scaled with the sub-sample population of students divided
by the whole sample population in each income quartile to get comparable results with the benchmark reports. The next four columns report results for
a non-zero structural correlation between unobservable shocks to wealth and college-related ability at the student level. For each correlation value -1,
-0.5, 0.5, and 1, the model is re-estimated to match the targeted data moments as in the benchmark estimation, and then the counterfactual results are
calculated and reported in the table. The last set of columns reports counterfactual results assuming that private colleges change the tuition in response to
the expansion of the higher education subsidies. Upon making public colleges tuition-free in the extreme scenario (1) private colleges reduce tuition (net
of grant) by one third (roughly the estimated median markup, so profits are reduce to zero), and in scenario (2) private colleges reduce net tuition by one
sixth of the base net tuition level (roughly half of the estimated median markup). I assume that in response to expanding Pell grants as the alternative
to making public colleges tuition-free, private colleges raise tuition by half of the increase in the implied Pell revenue in each scenario, implicitly assuming
that students and private colleges benefit on a 50-50 basis from expanding federal Pell grants.

APPENDIX
Supplementary Materials
A.1. SMM: Optimization Algorithm
I use a hybrid algorithm to estimate the parameters via minimizing the SMM error loss.
Call the vector of parameters by p, for which the simulated set of moments is denoted by
the vector m(p); the corresponding data moments by d, a vector of the same size as m(·);
and the weight matrix in calculating distance between data and simulated moments by W .
The estimated set of parameters, noted by p∗ , is obtained via
p∗ = arg min (m(p) − d)T W (m(p) − d)
p

(A.1)

Minimizing the objective function in the program (A.1) via a global algorithm is not feasible
in practice, with a wide enough search over the set of possible parameters. This is the case
in my model because, given a parameter vector p, the optimal choice of financing structure
is first solved for each student that may enroll a college with specific tuition cost and grant
structure; then a fixed point problem is solved to obtain college- and student-type fixed
effect terms {δu } and {δs } determining college education values; and finally the aggregate
simulated moments m(p) is obtained from the college enrollment likelihoods derived from
the solution to optimal financing decision and the solution for college value fixed effects.
This quantitative process is time-consuming.
To tackle this quantitative challenge, I first simulate the economic model for 150,000 pseudo
random parameters picked up from a wide enough space of feasible parameters. I then train
a machine to learn the behavior of the economic model. This machine basically gives me
a fit of m(·), with a large enough R2 . Call it the auxiliary model m̂(p). Evaluating m̂(p)
for any arbitrary p is fast enough, so that I can quickly solve the program (A.1) with the
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auxiliary model replaced for the true economic model; call the solution by p̂∗ :
p̂∗ = arg min (m̂(p) − d)T W (m̂(p) − d)
p

(A.2)

I use TikTak optimization algorithm to find p̂∗ , with a wide enough initial global search on
the entire set of parameters.1 Plus, I use a diagonal weight matrix W in this step, with
elements being inverse of the variance of targeted data moments. Based on performance
evaluation of the training machine with various test targeted moments (for which I know
the true parameter values), choosing a diagonal weight matrix minimizes the approximation
error due to employing the auxiliary model instead of true economic model.
Lastly, I perform a local optimization algorithm—Nelder-Mead method, with the true economic model as in the program (A.1), and with the initial starting point p̂∗ obtained as the
solution to the auxiliary SMM (A.2). This step helps to minimize the approximation error.
To find an efficient estimate, I set W to the efficient weight matrix in this last step, being
the inverse of the sum of data variance covariance matrix and the simulation error variance
covariance matrix.2 Once I obtain the point estimate, I use the standard SMM formula to
calculate the standard deviation of parameter estimates where Jacobian matrix—derivatives
of moments with respect to parameters is calculated using the true simulated moments.

A.2. Colleges’ Optimization Problem and Markup Estimation
I consider a Bertrand competition model between colleges in setting tuition and fees. A
college solves a straightforward optimization problem. Call the quantity of demand by student type s for college u with qsu . The quantity qsu is derived both by the probability of
enrolling in the college u by student type s, and the time spent in that college —determined
by the degree choice for that student type. Importantly, different student types could have
systematically different likelihood of dropout, associate and bachelor degree, either of which
1

See notes on TikTak algorithm and its benchmarks in Arnoud et al. (2019).
To obtain the simulation error variance covariance matrix I evaluate the true simulated moments m(·)
at the initial parameter value of the local optimization problem p̂∗ for 300 random draws of shocks to wealth
and ability as the state variables of the model.
2
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is associated with distinguished number of years spent in that college. The demand quantity per student type qsu depends on the entire set of tuition and fees charged by all the
universities, as well as geographic distribution of students and colleges, external financing
costs, and institutional features, such as limits on federal Stafford loans and generosity of
state and federal grants.
The owners of a private college u (trustees/shareholders) set tuition levels to maximize the
following objective function taking the tuition charged by other institutions as given

max

{Tu }u∈O

XZ
u∈O

non-pecuniary
inst
[qsu (Tu − mcu − gsu
) +

z }| {
qsu vu

]

s

where O is the entire set of colleges owned by the entity, mcu is the constant marginal
inst is the grant provided
cost of providing education services to a student in college u, gsu

by the college to the student, and vu is the extent to which providing higher education by
institution u to students has intrinsic nonmonetary value for the owners. One may argue
that vu is zero in case of for-profit colleges. One can even argue that vu is negative for some
private nonprofit colleges, as a college would not prefer to enroll a large number of students,
even though it has a negligible cost to admit a student, just to maintain a high selectivity
standard. The model can accommodate any vu ∈ R.
Define the effective marginal cost mc
c u as
mc
c u := mcu − vu
I.e., marginal cost net of non-pecuniary value of education per-pupil. I cannot identify mcu
from vu separately in mc
c u by observing the tuition and fees charged by college u. Given the
available data it is observationally the same if a college face a huge cost of enrolling students
but puts nonpecuniary value to provide higher education to students, or if the college just
faces a minimal marginal cost. mc
c is all I can identify via demand estimation, and in fact
mc
c is all I need in order to perform market equilibrium analysis in counterfactual analysis.
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The Bertrand equilibrium setup delivers the following first-order-condition (FOC) for the
tuition charged by the set of colleges. I present FOCs in a vectorized format
T − mc
c = (Q − γ̃)E −1

(A.3)

where Q is a row vector with uth element being total demand for college u:
Z
Qu :=

qsu
s

E is the matrix of price elasticity of demand, adjusted for ownership structure matrix O.
Row u and column u′ of matrix O is 1 if colleges u and u′ belongs to a same entity; otherwise,
it is zero. Here is the row u and column u′ of the matrix E:

Euu′ := −Ouu′ ∂Qu /∂Tu′

Finally, γ̃ is a row vector that captures the extent to which changing tuition would affect
total grants provided by a higher education institution to students:

γ̃u :=

X
u′

Z
O

u′ u
s

inst
gsu
′ ∂qsu′ /∂Tu

Demand estimation gives us estimates of the demand elasticity, so I get γ̃ and E, which
together with the demand quantity Q and observed tuition T backs out the effective marginal
costs for all colleges via equation (A.3). Summary stats of marginal cost estimates, together
with data reports of tuition, institution grants and faculty salaries as observable indicators of
costs and revenue are reported in table A.7. Overall tuition net of grants is around $16,000
for both nonprofit and for-profit private colleges, and the effective marginal cost is around
$10,000. Salary to faculties explain a significant share of the marginal cost for nonprofit
private colleges but not for for-profit colleges. Overall for both types of colleges the median
markup is $6,000.
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A.3. Supplementary Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Distribution of tuition and fees by income background
Income background
1st Quartile
2nd Quartile
3rd Quartile
4th Quartile

all

mean ($)

std ($)

8,900
(300)

percentiles
10th%

25th%

50th%

75th%

90th%

9,100

1,700

2,900

4,900

12,100

22,600

(300)

(100)

(200)

(300)

(1400)

(1400)

10,000

9,700

2,200

3,500

5,700

14,300

25,800

(300)

(300)

(100)

(200)

(200)

(1300)

(600)

10,000

9,600

2,300

3,800

5,900

11,900

25,700

(200)

(300)

(100)

(100)

(200)

(1000)

(800)

14,300

12,100

2,800

4,800

8,200

24,000

34,800

(300)

(200)

(300)

(300)

(200)

(700)

(1500)

11,100

10,600

2,200

3,800

6,300

17,100

27,700

(200)

(200)

(100)

(100)

(300)

(500)

(700)

Notes. Mean, standard deviation, and percentiles of tuition and fees in academic year 2003-04 is reported for
US students, first time enrolled full time in college in 2003-04 below the age of 21 as dependent individuals,
by parents’ income rank in 2002. Percentiles 25th, 50th, and 75th estimates of parents’ income for highschool graduates, $36,700, $70,700, and $119,600 in 2019 dollars, respectively, is used to categorize students.
Data on tuition and fees is reported in 2019 dollars. Numbers in parentheses show standard errors. Date
source: BPS:04/09.

84

Table A.2: Distance to college by income background
Distance (miles)
Income background
1st Quartile

2nd Quartile

3rd Quartile

4th Quartile

less than 30

median

mean

std

62.9%

20

124

462

(2.0)

(1)

(17)

(114)

52.5%

30

149

564

(1.9)

(2)

(20)

(140)

47.9%

36

158

444

(1.6)

(4)

(12)

(42)

36.3

70

255

610

(1.5)

(6)

(16)

(64)

Notes. Distance from permanent home to college in the academic year 2003-04 is reported for US students,
first time enrolled full time in college in 2003-04 below the age of 21 as dependent individuals, by parents’
income rank in 2002. Percentiles 25th, 50th, and 75th estimates of parents’ income for high-school graduates,
$36,700, $70,700, and $119,600 in 2019 dollars, respectively, is used to categorize students. Numbers in
parentheses show estimation standard errors. Data source: BPS:04/09.
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Table A.3: Average grants by income background
Income background:

1st Quartile

2nd Quartile

3rd Quartile

4th Quartile

160
500
1, 380

10
130
1, 050

—
300
1, 510

—
280
1, 940

220
790
3, 060
660
4, 750

80
410
3, 240
710
4, 440

Panel A: Need-based ($)
Federal
State
Institution

4, 210
1, 230
1, 260

2, 000
1, 210
1, 660

Panel B: Merit-based ($)
Federal
State
Institution

—
150
860

—
230
1, 330

Panel C: All grants ($)
Federal
State
Institution
Private
All sources

4, 280
1, 390
2, 190
480
8, 330

2, 090
1, 450
3, 170
610
7, 310

Notes. This table reports average grants per student by grant type: merit- and need-based, and by source:
federal, state, institution (colleges and universities), and private, received in academic year 2003-04 by US
students, first time enrolled full time in college in 2003-04 below the age of 21 as dependent individuals,
by family income rank in 2002. Federal merit-based grants are negligible and are not reported due to
insufficient precision. Private grants by each merit- and need-based type are not separately reported in
the data. Note that panel (C) includes need- and merit-based grants reported in Panels (A) and (B), plus
non-need and merit grants. Percentiles 25th, 50th, and 75th estimates of parents’ income for high-school
graduates, $36,700, $70,700, and $119,600 in 2019 dollars, respectively, is used to categorize students. Data
is reported in 2019 dollar units. Average grants are calculated per student, not per grant recipient. Data
source: BPS:04/09.
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Table A.4: Tuition and fees for financially constrained students
Parents’ Income Quartile

log (Tuition and fees)
(Q1)

(Q2)

(Q3)

(Q4)

All

log (parents’ income)

-0.055 0.494***
(0.071) (0.135)

0.269*
(0.154)

0.347***
(0.057)

0.251***
(0.023)

1 {sibling in college}

-0.037
(0.068)

-0.006
(0.043)

-0.017
(0.037)

-0.066
(0.042)

-0.042*
(0.022)

1 {total loan = Stafford limits}

-0.143
(0.096)

-0.040
(0.064)

-0.098*
(0.056)

-0.071
(0.052)

-0.076**
(0.033)

log (total grants)

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

log (federal loans)

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

SAT score, high-school GPA
age, gender, race
parents’ education, family size

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

720
250
1,510
0.30

950
410
1,930
0.38

1,220
560
2,400
0.47

1,620
640
2,880
0.53

4,490
1,850
8,720
1.68

# {siblings in college} = Yes
# [ total loan = Stafford limits ]
Observations:
Survey population (million):

Notes. OLS regression of tuition and fees paid by US students first time enrolled full-time in college in the
academic year 2003-04 at age below 21 as dependent individuals, on parents’ income in 2002, an indicator
for students with a sibling in college in or before 2003-4, and an indicator for students with total loans being
equal to federal Stafford limits for subsidized loans ($3,600 or $4,800 in 2019 dollars, depending on class level)
and unsubsidized loans ($9,085 or $10,285 in 2019 dollars, depending on class level, for those whose parents
are denied for a federal PLUS loan due to poor credit and $3,600 or $4,800 in 2019 dollars, depending on
class level, for the rest) in the academic year 2003-04. Percentiles 25th, 50th, and 75th estimates of parents’
income for high-school graduates, $36,700, $70,700, and $119,600 in 2019 dollars, respectively, is used to put
students in different parental income quartiles. Numbers in parenthesis show estimation standard errors.
∗

Data source: BPS:04/09.
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p < 0.1

∗∗

p < 0.05

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Table A.5: Post-college earnings vs. degree choice, ability, and family background
Post-graduation earnings

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

constant (college dropouts)

28705***
(1389)

28719***
(1278)

30073***
(1274)

30158***
(1191)

1{associate’s degree}

2888
(2049)

2766
(2059)

3085
(2099)

3073
(2085)

1{bachelor’s degree}

7120***
(1323)

6255***
(1342)

5338***
(1369)

5475***
(1391)

129***
(45)

109**
(46)

65
(43)

tuition and fees,
2003-4 ($1,000)

116**
(53)

tuition and fees minus
grants, 2003-4 ($1,000)
1{parents have college
studies}

1326
(1257)

745
(1290)

636
(1286)

log (parents’ income)

1130**
(496)

701
(492)

415
(524)

2100***
(541)

2162***
(555)

SAT score

Observations:
Survey population:

5,570
1.1 million

Notes. Job earnings in 2009 for US students, first time enrolled full time in college in 2003-04 below the
age of 21 as dependent individuals, versus degree attainment through 2009, parents’ income (winsorized at
2.5%) and education in 2002, and SAT scores pre-enrolling in college. Log (parents’ income) and SAT score
are normalized by mean and std. Tuition and fees in 2003-4, and tuition and fees minus total grants in
2003-4 are in unit of $1,000. Variables earnings, tuition, and net tuition is in 2019 dollar units. Number of
observations and survey population is the same in all regressions. Numbers in parentheses show standard
∗

errors. Data source: BPS:04/09.
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p < 0.1

∗∗

p < 0.05

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Table A.6: Student loans and degree attainment; a policy experiment
Data

Total students loans ($)

Simulation
(1)

(2)

(3)

post policy

-93.641***
(15.089)

-83.181***
(16.268)

-73.783***
(18.679)

-1

constrained

5369.639***
(85.972)

5364.205***
(85.690)

5374.240***
(86.543)

5387

post policy ∗ constrained

1779.609***
(118.760)

1785.594***
(119.381)

1784.716***
(120.003)

1478

✓

family education and income
SAT score, high-school GPA

✓
✓

✓
✓

Data

1 {Bachelor degree}

Simulation

(1)

(2)

(3)

post policy

-0.003
(0.017)

0.004
(0.016)

-0.004
(0.016)

-0.0001

constrained

0.077***
(0.018)

0.093***
(0.016)

0.064***
(0.016)

0.0077

post policy ∗ constrained

-0.007
(0.027)

-0.014
(0.025)

-0.014
(0.024)

✓

✓
✓

17,100
3.67

17,100
3.67

family education and income
SAT score, high-school GPA
Observations:
Survey population (million):

17,100
3.67

-0.0013

✓
✓

Notes. Regression results for total student loans in 2019 dollar and five year bachelor degree attainment as a
dummy variable are shown in Panel A and Panel B, based on survey data from two cohorts of students: firsttime and first-year dependent college enrollees below the age of 21 in the academic year 2003-04 and in the
academic year 2011-2012. Right hand side include a dummy for the cohort 2011-2012 who are experiencing an
expansion in maximum limit of $2625 to $3,500 for subsidized and to 5,500$ for subsidized and unsubsidized
federal loans in comparison to the cohort 2003-2004; a dummy variable indicating financially constrained
students, defined as those with a total loan at least equal to the pre-policy limit $2625; and controls being
parental income and college education and students’ SAT and high school GPA. The last column simulates the
same regression by exposing the same cohort of 2003-04 to the loan expansion under estimated fundamental
parameters. The median estimate of 300 simulation results is reported here. Numbers in parentheses show
estimate standard errors. Data source: BPS:04/09 & BPS:12/17.
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∗

p < 0.1

∗∗

p < 0.05

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Table A.7: Estimates of colleges’ marginal costs
College type:

for-profit

private nonprofit

Panel A: Data
Tuition and fees ($)
Institution grants ($)
Salary to faculties ($)

16,460
80
1,660

25,890
9,220
5,400

Panel B: Estimation
Effective marginal costs

10,210

10,450

Notes. This table reports median statistics for private colleges weighted by number of enrollees. All variables
are reported in 2019 dollars. Panel A reports measures of revenue and cost sources from data. Both tuition
and fees and grants are reported on a per year basis. Salary to faculties is derived by total salary paid to all
faculties per year divided by the number of enrollees per year. Panel B reports estimated effective marginal
costs implied by the model presented in section A.2. Data source: IPEDS:2003-04.
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